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WENDY C. GERZOG∗ 
From the Greedy to the Needy 
In some instances when a taxpayer makes a charitable donation, 
the loss of revenue to the government, and the corresponding gain to 
the taxpayer, far exceeds the benefit to the charity.  Some of these 
losses may be generated by government-sanctioned complex 
transactions and even government-created devices.  This Article 
analyzes various charitable donations in terms of the dollars gained 
by the taxpayer, the dollars lost by the government, and the dollars 
received by the charity.  After considering a sliding scale of benefits 
to the charities in light of the revenue losses to the government and 
taxpayer gains, this Article makes some normative conclusions about 
whether the good a donor does justifies his currently available tax 
benefits and then proposes some solutions. 
INTRODUCTION 
here are altruistic donors who make charitable gifts and do not 
expect anything in return.1  Indeed, there are many taxpaying 
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1 Although there are economists who reject the possibility of “pure altruism” and 
maintain that the illusion of altruism is actually “the ‘warm glow’ effect—the pleasurable 
feeling of playing Lady Bountiful and basking in public admiration,” researchers at the 
University of Oregon have discovered that “[p]aying taxes, according to the brain, can 
bring satisfaction.”  According to the results of their research, 
 Civil societies function because people pay taxes and make charitable 
contributions to provide public goods. One possible motive for charitable 
T 
 1134 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 1133 
donors who cannot,2 and some who do not,3 acquire any financial 
 
contributions, called “pure altruism,” is satisfied by increases in the public good 
no matter the source or intent.  Another possible motive, “warm glow,” is only 
fulfilled by an individual’s own voluntary donations. . . . Both pure altruism and 
warm-glow motives appear to determine the hedonic consequences of financial 
transfers to the public good. 
John Tierney, Taxes a Pleasure? Check the Brain Scan, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2007, at F1 
(citing the research of William T. Harbaugh, Ulrich Mayr & Daniel R. Burghart, Neural 
Responses to Taxation and Voluntary Giving Reveal Motives for Charitable Donations, 
316 SCIENCE 1622 (2007), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/ 
316/5831/1622). 
2 If a taxpayer does not itemize her deductions, but is limited to the standard deduction, 
she has no tax benefit for her charitable contribution.  From 1982 to 1986, Congress 
provided for a direct charitable deduction, an “above the line” adjustment to income, for 
nonitemizers (former I.R.C. § 170(i) (2006)).  In 1982 and in 1983, that deduction was 
equal to 25% of contributions up to a maximum deduction of $100; in 1984, applying the 
same percentage, that limit was increased to $300.  In 1985, Congress allowed a 50% 
deduction and in 1986, a 100% deduction to nonitemizers with no dollar limitation, except 
for the percentage limitations applicable to both itemized and nonitemized deductions 
under I.R.C. § 170(b).  See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 
121(a), 95 Stat. 172, 196 (1981) (additional views of Senators Packwood, Heinz, 
Durenberger, Bentsen, Moynihan, and Baucus); H.R. REP. NO. 97-215, at 273 (1981) 
(Conf. Rep.).  “The average income for 1981 for itemizers is estimated to be $31,533.  In 
contrast, the average income for persons taking the standard deduction is estimated to be 
only $12,600.  This legislation will encourage these 43,000,000 households to participate 
in giving.”  Id.  Some have called for the return of a nonitemized deduction or for the 
adoption of a credit for charitable donations for those taxpayers who claim the standard 
deduction.  See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution 
Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REV. 843 (2001) (arguing for a nonitemized charitable deduction 
that exceeds a certain floor or for a credit instead of a full deduction), but some view the 
deduction as “double dipping” in light of the role of the standard deduction.  See, e.g., 
Ronald A. Pearlman, Repeal of Charitable Contributions for Nonitemizers Explained, 28 
TAX NOTES 1140, 1140 (Sept. 2, 1985). 
3 Besides not receiving a quid pro quo from the charity for their gift, there are probably 
some taxpayers who could itemize but choose not to do so (perhaps to avoid record 
keeping or more complicated tax returns). 
 In the past, the General Accounting Office has found that filers who used the 
standard deduction instead of itemizing paid the Internal Revenue Service almost 
$1 billion a year more than they should have. 
. . . . 
Critics of the tax code say this is because many people choose to forgo savings 
for simplicity.  Using the standard deduction, regardless of the tax costs, means 
they can end their annual tax involvement sooner. 
. . . . 
The GAO says it was mainly lower-income and middle-income taxpayers.  
Taxpayers in the $25,000-to-$50,000 income range accounted for the bulk of 
those who paid too much; filers earning between $50,000 and $75,000 were a 
close second. 
Bankrate.com, Didn’t Itemize? You May Be Overpaying IRS, MSN Money, 
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Taxes/PreparationTips/DidnotItemizeYouMayHave
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benefit for their largesse.  On the other hand, there are taxpayers who 
want something in return for their charitable donation.  That 
“something” may be a token gift from the charity.  In this instance, 
the donation amount is reduced to reflect the amount the charity 
actually benefits, resulting in a net gift.  The return on the taxpayer’s 
donation, however, may be derived from the tax system instead of, or 
in addition to, a financial reward from the charity.  The taxpayer may 
receive this benefit directly as a charitable donation deduction that 
reduces her tax liability4 while at the same time decreasing the 
government’s revenue.  Alternatively, or in addition to that direct tax 
benefit, a taxpayer may receive a monetary gain through the tax 
system.  This advantage can be accomplished through a series of 
complex transactions incorporating a charitable gift as an integral 
element of a tax scheme.5  Indeed, there are transactions incorporating 
 
OverpaidIRS.aspx?page=all (last visited July 16, 2009).  However, some say the opposite 
is true, that you can save money by not itemizing and by using the standard deduction 
instead, particularly if you may be subject to the alternative minimum tax if you choose to 
itemize.  Press Release, The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Choosing 
Standard Deduction Might Cut Tax Bill, AICPA Says; CPAs Offer Tax Tips About AMT 
and Tax Law Changes, March 25, 2008, http://www.aicpa.org/download/news/2008/ 
AICPA_Tax_Tips_-_3-25-08.pdf. 
4 The percentage limitations of section 170(b) allow a maximum deduction of 50% of 
the individual taxpayer’s contribution base (see I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(F), defining 
contribution base as adjusted gross income computed without any section 172 net 
operating loss carryback) in any one year, regardless of the nature or recipient of the 
charitable contribution, with the excess carried forward into the next successive five years. 
See I.R.C. §§ 170(b)(1)(A)–(D), (d)(1). 
5 This Article will not address the quid pro quo receipt of spiritual benefits like those 
asserted in Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989), which, after Rev. Rul. 93-
73, 1993-2 C.B. 75 (ruling that its Rev. Rul. 78-189, 1978-1 C.B. 68, which was the 
subject of the Church of Scientology ruling in Hernandez, was thereby obsolete), continue 
to be problematic, especially in the area of parochial school tuition payments in such cases 
as Sklar v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 281, 298–99 (2005) (“According to a letter sent to 
petitioners in 1994 from the chief of the adjustments branch, Fresno Service Center, the 
settlement agreement between the Commissioner and the Church of Scientology allows 
individuals to claim, as charitable contributions, 80 percent of the cost of qualified 
religious services.”); Sklar v. Commissioner, 282 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 2002), amending and 
superseding 279 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’g 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1815 (2000); see also 
Allan J. Samansky, Deductibility of Contributions to Religious Institutions, 24 VA. TAX 
REV. 65 (2004) (advocating the deductibility of auditing payments but not of training 
payments).  Although an analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, the IRS 
considers this area to be one of increased noncompliance and abuse.  “IRS examiners are 
seeing an upturn in instances where taxpayers try to disguise private tuition payments as 
contributions to charitable or religious organizations.”  Internal Revenue Service, Phishing 
Scams, Frivolous Arguments Top the 2008 “Dirty Dozen” Tax Scams, March 13, 2008, 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=180075,00.html [hereinafter 2008 Dirty 
Dozen]; see Rev. Rul. 83-104, 1983-2 C.B. 46. 
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charitable donations that, as a practical matter, could not be achieved 
without a charitable gift as central to the taxpayer’s receipt of 
financial gain.  On the other hand, there is evidence that some donors 
increase the size of their contributions because they receive a greater 
tax benefit.6  According to the government’s statistics, contributions 
decline when the tax rate decreases.7  There is a range of financial 
 
6 S. REP. NO. 97-144, at 179 (1981), as reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105 (additional 
views of Senators Packwood, Heinz, Durenberger, Bentsen, Moynihan, and Baucus) (“For 
example, the reduction in maximum rate from 70% to 50%, although fully meritorious to 
stimulate investment, will lead to less giving by persons in those higher brackets.  Also, 
the reductions in estate and gift taxes will decrease the role of charitable giving in estate 
planning.”); see Outside the Box on Estate Tax Reform: Reviewing Ideas to Simplify 
Planning: Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 
S. Hearing] (statement of Diana Aviv, President and CEO Independent Sector), available 
at http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/ testimony/2008test/040308datest.pdf. 
 These incentives have had a significant influence on the how—and how 
much—Americans give to support charitable causes.  The Congressional Budget 
Office found that the estate tax leads affluent people to donate far more than they 
otherwise would, because such donations—whether made during life or as 
bequests at death—sharply reduce estate tax liability.  The CBO found that about 
one-sixth of the estates filing estate tax returns in 2000 left a charitable bequest 
which together totaled $16 billion.  Charitable bequests were heavily 
concentrated in the largest estates with over 70 percent of the total bequests 
coming from estates valued at more than $3.5 million. 
 The CBO further estimated that if the estate tax had not existed in 2000, 
donations to charities would have been reduced by $13 billion to $25 billion, 
which is more than the total amount of corporate donations in that year.  For 
example, if a potential donor’s assets would be subject to a 45% estate tax rate, 
then a charitable bequest of $1 million would reduce the tax liability of the estate 
by $450,000.  The unlimited deduction for charitable giving provides a valuable 
incentive for the wealthiest of our citizens to give back to the communities in 
which they have lived and earned success. 
 If Congress were to repeal the estate tax or significantly reduce estate tax 
marginal rates, the significant decline in charitable donations from wealthy 
Americans forecast by the Congressional Budget Office study would have 
damaging effects on the nonprofit community and on society as a whole.  
Donations from individuals, including bequests, make up 84% of all 
contributions, constituting one-sixth of the total support for charitable nonprofits.  
Moreover, about two-thirds of all contributions by individuals in 2000 were made 
by people with a net worth high enough to potentially face the estate tax.  If 
nonprofit groups lost a substantial part of these donations, many of them would 
have to scale back their activities significantly. 
Id. at 2–3 (footnote omitted); see also Charles T. Clotfelter, Tax-Induced Distortions in the 
Voluntary Sector, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663, 686 (1989). 
7 See Darien B. Jacobson, Brian G. Raub & Barry W. Johnson, The Estate Tax: Ninety 
Years and Counting, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN 118, 126 (Summer 2007), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/ninetyestate.pdf (explaining the drop in 
charitable contributions following the passage of The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981)).  The authors suggested that both the 
passage of the unlimited marital deduction wherein “gifts to charities no longer provided a 
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benefits that a donor can derive either from a charity, such as in a net 
gift, or from the government in a tax benefit.  While those that match 
the benefit to the charity do not raise concerns, there are situations 
where the donor’s considerable financial return far outweighs the 
benefit that the charity receives.8 
The concept of quid pro quo is usually viewed as a simple two-
party transaction between the purported donor and the charity.  The 
issue examined is whether, or to what extent, the transfer between 
them is a sale or a gift.  Under American Bar Endowment,9 there are 
two prerequisites for a charitable deduction where the taxpayer has 
received a benefit: first, she must intend to make a gift;10 and second, 
her gift is deductible only if, and to the extent that, it exceeds the 
consideration she obtains.11  When a taxpayer seeks to use the tax 
system to benefit from her charitable gift in addition to the tax benefit 
derived from a commensurate charitable deduction, quid pro quo and 
the examination of donative intent should be expanded to encompass 
the consequences to the alleged donor, the charity, and the 
government.  This extension is appropriate because the charitable 
deduction is premised on, or justified by, being a less intrusive means 
to serve the pubic good than a direct government expenditure.12  
 
tax advantage over bequests to a spouse” as well as the twenty-two point reduction in the 
maximum estate tax rates likely triggered that effect.  “Second, under ERTA, the top 
marginal estate tax rate was reduced from 77 percent to 55 percent, and, according to some 
research, tax rates affect the charitable giving at death in both the size of charitable 
bequests and the number of charitable organizations named as beneficiaries.”  Id. (citing 
D. Joulfaian, Charitable Bequests and Estate Taxes, 44(2) NAT’L TAX J. 169 (1991)). 
8 Where a taxpayer receives a benefit of equal value for his donation, he is ineligible for 
a charitable contribution deduction.  United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 
117–18 (1986); Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 105. 
9 Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 117–18.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h) (2008). 
10 Donative intent is pivotal to a gift in an income tax context for a recipient to qualify 
for the exclusion under section 102.  See Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960). 
However, since the beneficiary of a charitable gift is a tax-exempt organization, the 
requirement is unnecessary for this purpose.  On the other hand, in the transfer tax context, 
the lack of donative intent may indicate a bona fide sale in the ordinary course of a trade or 
business, but donative intent is generally irrelevant for transfer tax purposes where the 
only criteria to determine a gift is whether or not there is an unequal exchange of value.  
See I.R.C. § 2512(b) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (2008). 
11 477 U.S. at 118 (“The sine qua non of a charitable contribution is a transfer of money 
or property without adequate consideration.  The taxpayer, therefore, must at a minimum 
demonstrate that he purposely contributed money or property in excess of the value of any 
benefit he received in return.”). 
12 The deduction for charitable donations has alternatively been justified.  See, e.g., 
William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
309, 314–15 (1972) (“In the case of many charitable contributions the material goods or 
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Moreover, in the transfer tax13 context, where an unequal exchange 
constitutes a gift, that exchange is not restricted to a two-party 
exchange.  Where a transaction or a series of integrated transactions 
affect multiple parties, determining who has made a gift and who has 
received a gift requires examining what each party has ultimately 
gained or lost. 
Compliance is an element of this problem and legislation continues 
to be enacted or proposed to deal with this part of the abuse14 because 
 
services purchased with the contributed funds inure entirely to the benefit of persons other 
than the donor, and the donor enjoys only the nonmaterial satisfaction of making a gift. . . .  
A good argument can be made that taxable personal consumption should be defined to 
include divisible, private goods and services whose consumption by one household 
precludes enjoyment by others, but not collective goods whose enjoyment is nonpreclusive 
or the nonmaterial satisfactions that arise from making contributions.”).  However, the 
charitable donation deduction has also been criticized.  See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel, 
Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for the Income Tax 
Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377, 378 (1972) (in order to eliminate tax inequity and the bias 
in favor of the wealthy, “we should substitute for the charitable contribution deduction a 
system of direct federal assistance for private charitable organizations through a matching 
grant mechanism”).  The literature in this area is extensive; some recent works include: 
Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions, 84 IND. L.J. 
(Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 08-09, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1117549; David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 
39 CONN. L. REV. 531, 545–66 (2006); Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, “Gifts, 
Gafts, and Gefts” - The Income Tax Definition and Treatment of Private and Charitable 
“Gifts” and a Principled Policy Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income, 78 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 441, 513–14 (2003); David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable 
Contributions: Incentives, Information and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals 3 
(Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 327), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1097644 (“This Article analyzes three 
reasons to subsidize charitable contributions, each responding to a different information or 
incentive problem that is inherent in the pursuit of public goals.  First, the subsidy can 
counter free-riding by encouraging donors to be more generous.  A second objective is to 
measure and respond to popular preferences about public goals.  Subsidized charity can 
encourage experimentation and competition and can empower minority perspectives that 
are underrepresented in the political process.  Yet subsidized charity also 
disproportionately represents the views of wealthy donors.  The third goal, which is new to 
the academic literature, is to recruit private donors to monitor the quality of nonprofits, so 
that the government can piggyback on these quality-control efforts.”); Johnny Rex 
Buckles, The Case for the Taxpaying Good Samaritan: Deducting Earmarked Transfers to 
Charity Under Federal Income Tax Law, Theory and Policy, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1243, 
1277–97 (2002); Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for 
Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 456 
n.162 (1998). 
13 Transfer taxes include federal gift, estate, and generation-skipping transfer taxes. 
I.R.C. Chs. 11, 12 & 13. 
14 See infra Part II. 
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the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), with its limited resources,15 has 
proved inadequate.16  While acknowledging the role of compliance, 
this Article will primarily analyze devices and transactions that are 
government sanctioned17 and even government created.18 
This Article will analyze various charitable donations in terms of 
the dollars gained by the taxpayer, the dollars lost by the government, 
and the dollars received by the charity.  After considering a sliding 
scale of benefits to the charities in light of the revenue losses to the 
government and taxpayer gains, this Article also makes normative 
conclusions about whether the good a donor does justifies his 
currently available tax benefits. 
I 
COMPLIANCE 
Much of the recent legislation regarding charitable deductions has 
focused on compliance.  Abuse in this area has centered on valuation 
exaggeration of noncash charitable gifts.  Although sometimes 
exposing blatant noncompliance, the legislation often merely reveals 
the need for the charity to quantify and delineate the benefits split 
between itself and the taxpayer and to notify the taxpayer of each 
element of the net gift.  Although the last fifteen years have produced 
legislation to deal with these abuses, problems in this area persist.19 
In 1993, Congress enacted Internal Revenue Code section 
(“section”) 170(f)(8) increasing taxpayer substantiation 
requirements20 and section 6115 placing a disclosure requirement on 
 
15 See Allen Kenney, IRS Plans Significant Cuts to Estate Tax Program, 112 TAX 
NOTES 418, 418 (July 31, 2006). 
16 “The IRS continues to observe the misuse of tax-exempt organizations. Misuse 
includes . . . attempts by donors to maintain control over donated assets or income from 
donated property and overvaluation of contributed property.”  2008 Dirty Dozen, supra 
note 5. 
17 For example, taxpayers have realized significant tax benefits from defined value 
clauses coupled with charitable gifts in transactions where self-interest or greed is 
paramount to benefiting a charity.  Courts have legitimatized these abuses.  See infra Part 
VII.B. 
18 Techniques such as charitable lead trusts are statutory creations.  I.R.C. §§ 170(f), 
2055(e), 2522(c) (2006).  See infra Part V.B. 
19 2008 Dirty Dozen, supra note 5. 
20 Section 170(f)(8) provides that: 
[n]o deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any contribution of $250 
or more unless the taxpayer substantiates the contribution by a contemporaneous 
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the charities21 to deal with the administrative difficulties involved in a 
quid pro quo transfer.22  The donor often did not receive notification 
from the charity that some or all of the transfers were nondeductible 
before the enactment of the 1993 statutes.23  Similarly, 200424 
 
written acknowledgment of the contribution by the donee organization that meets 
the requirements of subparagraph (B). 
 (B) Content of acknowledgment.  An acknowledgment meets the 
requirements of this subparagraph if it includes the following information: 
 (i) The amount of cash and a description (but not value) of any property 
other than cash contributed. 
 (ii) Whether the donee organization provided any goods or services in 
consideration, in whole or in part, for any property described in clause (i). 
 (iii) A description and good faith estimate of the value of any goods or 
services referred to in clause (ii) or, if such goods or services consist solely 
of intangible religious benefits, a statement to that effect. 
 For purposes of this subparagraph, the term “intangible religious 
benefit” means any intangible religious benefit which is provided by an 
organization organized exclusively for religious purposes and which 
generally is not sold in a commercial transaction outside the donative 
context. 
21 Section 6115 provides: 
(a) Disclosure requirement.  If an organization described in section 170(c) (other 
than paragraph (1) thereof) receives a quid pro quo contribution in excess of $75, 
the organization shall, in connection with the solicitation or receipt of the 
contribution, provide a written statement which— 
 (1) informs the donor that the amount of the contribution that is deductible for 
Federal income tax purposes is limited to the excess of the amount of any money 
and the value of any property other than money contributed by the donor over the 
value of the goods or services provided by the organization, and 
 (2) provides the donor with a good faith estimate of the value of such goods or 
services. 
(b) Quid pro quo contribution.  For purposes of this section, the term “quid pro 
quo contribution” means a payment made partly as a contribution and partly in 
consideration for goods or services provided to the payor by the donee 
organization.  A quid pro quo contribution does not include any payment made to 
an organization, organized exclusively for religious purposes, in return for which 
the taxpayer receives solely an intangible religious benefit that generally is not 
sold in a commercial transaction outside the donative context. 
22 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 13172-13173, 
107 Stat. 312, 455 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Tax Act]. 
23 See H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 785 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 553 
[hereinafter 1993 H.R. REP.]. 
 Difficult problems of tax administration arise with respect to fundraising 
techniques in which an organization that is eligible to receive deductible 
contributions provides goods or services in consideration for payments from 
donors.  Organizations that engage in such fundraising practices often do not 
inform their donors that all or a portion of the amount paid by the donor may not 
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legislation inhibits the overvaluation of donations of property, 
particularly of conservation easements,25 patents,26 and vehicles;27 
 
be deductible as a charitable contribution.  Consequently, the committee believes 
that there will be increased compliance with present-law rules governing 
charitable contribution deductions if a taxpayer who claims a separate charitable 
contribution of $750 or more is required to obtain substantiation from the donee 
indicating the amount of the contribution and whether any goods, service, or 
privilege was received by the donor in exchange for making the contribution.  In 
addition, the committee believes it is appropriate that, in all cases where a charity 
receives a quid pro quo contribution (i.e., a payment made partly as a 
contribution and partly in consideration for goods or services furnished to the 
payor by the donee organization), the charity should inform the donor that the 
deduction under section 170 is limited to the amount by which the payment 
exceeds the value of goods or services furnished by the charity, and should 
provide a good faith estimate of the value of such goods or services. 
138 CONG. REC. S11246-01 (Aug. 3, 1992). 
24 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, Title III, § 335(a), Title 
IV, § 413(c)(30), Title VIII, §§ 882(a), (b), (d), 883(a), 884(a) (2004), 118 Stat. 1418, 
1509, 1627, 1631, 1632 (2004).  See H.R. REP. NO. 108-755, at 532, 536, 538 (2004) 
(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1341 [hereinafter H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 
108-755]. 
25 See Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening to Good 
Charities: Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. 17 (2004) [hereinafter 
2004 Hearing], available at http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing062204.htm 
(statement of the Hon. Mark Everson, Commissioner, IRS, Washington, D.C.) (“We have 
seen several abuses in this area [Conservation Easements].  There have been cases where 
the easement being donated is overvalued.  There are also cases in which the donor, or the 
donor’s successor in interest, takes an action inconsistent with the easement without 
adverse consequences.  The conservation easement rules place the charity in a watchdog 
role over the easements it possesses.  If the charity fails to monitor these properties 
(another failure in governance), the potential exists for inconsistent use by the landowner 
of the property upon which the original deduction was premised.  In other cases, taxpayers 
are claiming large deductions when they are not entitled to any deduction at all (e.g., when 
taxpayers fail to comply with the law and regulations governing deductions for 
contributions of conservation easements.”); Fred Stokeld, Major Changes to EO 
Information Return Under Consideraton, IRS’s Miller Says, 108 TAX NOTES 722, 722 
(Aug. 15, 2005) (specifically, Steven T. Miller, IRS Tax Exempt/Government Entities 
Commissioner described abuses involving donations of conservation and façade easements 
as stemming from a lack of quality appraisals in support of their deductions); 2004 
Hearing, supra note 25, at 18 (statement of Diana Aviv, President and CEO Independent 
Sector) (“While few gifts of tangible property, beyond land donations and a small 
percentage of fine art objects, are of sufficient financial value to justify the expense 
involved in ascertaining appraisals to the extent recommended for The Nature 
Conservancy, all nonprofits should establish and follow clearer standards for accepting 
the Form 8283 estimates provided by donors to support tax deductions for contributed 
property. . . . Congress should establish appropriate thresholds for the financial value of 
those deductions to ensure that it does not create barriers inadvertently to accepting 
contributions by responsible charities.  Further investigation is called for concerning the 
costs of responsible appraisals and systems for the certification of appraisers to avoid 
unwanted, unintended consequences of discouraging responsible donors while leaving 
loopholes for those who would manipulate the system for personal gain.”). 
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and intensifies enforcement efforts by increasing the reporting 
requirements for noncash charitable contributions.28 
The government focused on the problems of overvaluation,29 quid 
pro quo transactions, and how much of the property was transferred 
for patents and similar property.  To deal with these issues, the 2004 
 
26 The 2004 legislation added sections 170(e)(1)(iii) and 170(m), and the reporting 
requirements in section 6050L.  These laws are applicable to contributions made after June 
3, 2004.  See H.R. REP. NO. 108-548(I), at 300 (2004) (“The provision provides that if a 
taxpayer contributes a patent or other intellectual property (other than certain copyrights or 
inventory) to a charitable organization, the taxpayer’s initial charitable deduction is limited 
to the lesser of the taxpayer’s basis in the contributed property or the fair market value of 
the property.  In addition, the taxpayer is permitted to deduct, as a charitable deduction, 
certain additional amounts in the year of contribution or in subsequent taxable years based 
on a specified percentage of the qualified donee income received or accrued by the 
charitable donee with respect to the contributed property.”). 
27 The 2004 legislation dealing with the charitable contributions of vehicles included 
sections 170(f)(12) and 6720, effective December 31, 2004.  See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 
108-755, supra note 24, at 598 (“Under the Senate amendment, the amount of deduction 
for charitable contributions of vehicles (generally including automobiles, boats, and 
airplanes for which the claimed value exceeds $500 and excluding inventory property) 
depends upon the use of the vehicle by the donee organization.  If the donee organization 
sells the vehicle without any significant intervening use or material improvement of such 
vehicle by the organization, the amount of the deduction shall not exceed the gross 
proceeds received from the sale.”  The vehicle must comply with the reporting 
requirements of the concurrently enacted section 170(f)(11), however, appraisals are not 
required where vehicles are sold by the donee organization without a significant 
intervening use or material improvement of the vehicle by the donee; instead, the charity 
must provide donor with a certification that the vehicle was sold in an arm's length 
transaction between unrelated parties, must include proceeds amount from the sale and a 
statement that the donor’s deduction may not exceed that value.  Id. at 538, 541.  Under 
the fraud provisions of section 6720, for an applicable vehicle (i.e., one “sold without a 
significant intervening use or material improvement”), there is a penalty equal to the 
greater of its sale proceeds or the amount calculated by multiplying the highest tax rate by 
the charity’s stated sales price.  “For all other acknowledgements, the penalty is the greater 
of $5,000 or the product of the highest rate of tax specified in section 1 and the claimed 
value of the vehicle.”  Id. at 599.); Fred Stokeld, Guidance Plan Includes Projects on 
Vehicle Donations, 108 TAX NOTES 721, 721 (Aug. 15, 2005). 
28 The 2004 legislation increasing the reporting requirements for noncash charitable 
gifts included section 170(f)(11), effective for contributions made after June 3, 2004.  The 
reporting requirements extend to corporations and partnerships and require the donor to 
obtain a qualified appraisal if the deduction exceeds $5000; if that contribution exceeds 
$500,000, the donor must attach the qualified appraisal to her tax return.  Except for 
reasonable cause, failure to submit the required appraisal results in the denial of a 
deduction.  See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 108-755, supra note 24, at 536–37. 
29 See William A. Drennan, Charitable Donations of Intellectual Property: The Case 
for Retaining the Fair Market Value Tax Deduction, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1045, 1077, 
1079–80 (2004) (concluding that the purpose of the legislation is “to prevent corporations 
from overvaluing charitable patent donations,” which may be the result of ignoring prior 
art or, because the value of a patent may be very speculative, the benefits may not be 
actualized). 
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legislation allows only a limited current deduction consisting of the 
lesser of basis or the fair market value of the property.30  By capping 
the donor’s deduction for patents, which may be elusive and difficult 
to value, Congress reined in unjustifiable gains to the donor that did 
not match the benefits to the charity.  On the other hand, the 2004 
legislation allows additional amounts to be deducted later to reflect an 
increased amount actually recouped from the property.31  That is, if 
the patent should actually produce an additional benefit to the charity 
in subsequent years, the donor may benefit to the same extent that the 
charity does.32  To aid in the taxpayer’s compliance, a qualified 
appraisal is required where the amount deducted is more than $5000; 
when the deductible amount is greater than $500,000, the taxpayer 
must attach the appraisal to her return.33 
Vehicle donations were also inflated34 and the 2004 legislation 
tightened rules around the charitable donations of used motor 
vehicles, boats, and airplanes.35  A charity must notify a donor who 
 
30 I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(iii). 
31 Id. § 170(m).  Some have disagreed with Congress’s approach and believe that it will 
reduce important charitable gifts.  See, e.g., Drennan, supra note 29, at 1152 (arguing for a 
fair market value deduction for charitable contributions of intellectual property on the 
basis of social policy that considers the many benefits resulting from those in-kind 
charitable donations, including encouraging contributions of copyrighted works from 
collectors and the donation of beneficial patents that the inventor does not or cannot 
further develop); Don MacBean, Better to Give Than to Receive: Evaluating Recent IP 
Donation Tax Policy Changes, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 19, ¶ 25 (2005) (advocating 
the coupling of a fair market value deduction with the required use of “a third party broker 
whose primary goal is matching donors with appropriate donees.  The broker will be either 
a government entity or a not-for-profit organization paid by the government for this 
purpose” (footnote omitted)). 
32 MacBean, supra note 31, at ¶ 6 (“[V]alue depends on possible future income streams, 
the property’s technical feasibility, and many other factors that are similarly difficult to 
predict.”).  The treatment accorded patents is similar to that suggested for charitable lead 
trusts.  See infra Part V.B. 
33 I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(11)(C)–(D), 6050L(b). 
34 2004 Hearing, supra note 25, at 25 (statement of the Hon. Mark Everson, 
Commissioner, IRS, Washington, D.C.). 
35 I.R.C. § 170(f)(12).  This section provides: 
In the case of a contribution of a qualified vehicle the claimed value of which 
exceeds $500— 
(i) paragraph (8) shall not apply and no deduction shall be allowed under 
subsection (a) for such contribution unless the taxpayer substantiates the 
contribution by a contemporaneous written acknowledgement of the 
contribution by the donee organization that meets the requirements of 
subparagraph (B) and includes the acknowledgement with the taxpayer’s 
return of tax which includes the deduction, and 
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contributes a vehicle valued at more than $500 of the gross proceeds 
from the sale, and the donor must substantiate that deduction with 
specified details required on his return.36  Moreover, the 2004 
legislation provides penalties for those charities that do not comply 
with the reporting requirements of section 170(f)(12).37 
 
(ii) if the organization sells the vehicle without any significant intervening 
use or material improvement of such vehicle by the organization, the amount 
of the deduction allowed under subsection (a) shall not exceed the gross 
proceeds received from such sale. 
(B) Content of acknowledgement.—An acknowledgement meets the 
requirements of this subparagraph if it includes the following information: 
(i) The name and taxpayer identification number of the donor. 
(ii) The vehicle identification number or similar number. 
(iii) In the case of a qualified vehicle to which subparagraph (A)(ii) 
applies— 
(I) a certification that the vehicle was sold in an arm’s length 
transaction between unrelated parties, 
(II) the gross proceeds from the sale, and 
(III) a statement that the deductible amount may not exceed the amount 
of such gross proceeds. 
(iv) In the case of a qualified vehicle to which subparagraph (A)(ii) does not 
apply— 
(I) a certification of the intended use or material improvement of the 
vehicle and the intended duration of such use, and 
(II) a certification that the vehicle would not be transferred in exchange 
for money, other property, or services before completion of such use or 
improvement. 
(v) Whether the donee organization provided any goods or services in 
consideration, in whole or in part, for the qualified vehicle. 
(vi)  A description and good faith estimate of the value of any goods or 
services referred to in clause (v) or, if such goods or services consist solely 
of intangible religious benefits (as defined in paragraph (8)(B)), a statement 
to that effect. 
36 Id. 
37 I.R.C. § 6720.  This provision, effective for contributions made after 2004, states: 
Any donee organization required under section 170(f)(12)(A) to furnish a 
contemporaneous written acknowledgment to a donor which knowingly furnishes 
a false or fraudulent acknowledgment, or which knowingly fails to furnish such 
acknowledgment in the manner, at the time, and showing the information 
required under section 170(f)(12), or regulations prescribed thereunder, shall for 
each such act, or for each such failure, be subject to a penalty equal to— 
(1) in the case of an acknowledgment with respect to a qualified vehicle to 
which section 170(f)(12)(A)(ii) applies, the greater of— 
(A) the product of the highest rate of tax specified in section 1 and the 
sales price stated on the acknowledgment, or 
(B) the gross proceeds from the sale of such vehicle, and 
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The strict rules regarding the donation of vehicles are a response to 
the excessive and dubious deductions that donors were taking, 
echoing the aggressive advertising of the donee charities.  “Highly 
troubling is GAO’s [General Accounting Office’s] analysis of 54 
specific donations, where it appears that the charity actually received 
less than 10% of the value claimed on the donor’s return in more than 
half the cases, and actually lost money on some vehicles.”38  The 
benefits to the donor in terms of a tax deduction sometimes exceeds 
any benefit to the charity.  Under a quid pro quo analysis of the 
taxpayer’s and charity’s gains and the government’s losses, no 
deduction should have been allowed to some taxpayers for their 
vehicle transfer to the charity.  However, this legislation has been 
effective: “[T]he number of automobile donations decreased 67.0 
percent from about 900.7 thousand in Tax Year 2004, to 297.1 
thousand in Tax Year 2005.  The amount claimed for these donations 
declined by 80.6 percent from $2.4 billion in 2004 to $0.5 billion in 
2005.”39 
In addition, 2006 legislation40 limits the abuses associated with the 
charitable donations of used clothing.41  The statute allows a 
 
(2) in the case of an acknowledgment with respect to any other qualified 
vehicle to which section 170(f)(12) applies, the greater of— 
(A) the product of the highest rate of tax specified in section 1 and the 
claimed value of the vehicle, or 
(B) $5,000. 
38 2004 Hearing, supra note 25, at 18. (statement of the Hon. Mark Everson, 
Commissioner, IRS, Washington, D.C.).  However, while “[t]he GAO states that its 
sample of specific donations was too small to allow generalization to all vehicle 
donations,” the results were still troubling.  Id. 
39 Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2005, 24 STATISTICS INCOME 
BULLETIN 68 (Spring 2008). 
40 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, Title XII, §§ 1202(a), 1204(a), 
1206(a), (b)(1), 1213(a)(1), (b)–(d), 1214(a), (b), 1215(a), 1216(a), 1217(a), 1218(a), 
1219(c)(1), 1234(a), 120 Stat. 1066, 1068, 1075, 1077, 1079–80, 1085, 1100 (2006) 
[hereinafter 2006 PPA].  See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 109TH CONGRESS 170, 597 (Joint 
Comm. Print 2006) [hereinafter STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 2006 GENERAL 
EXPLANATION]; 2008 S. Hearing (statement of Diana Aviv, President and CEO 
Independent Sector), supra note 6, at 5 (“Those reforms included increased fines and 
penalties for violations of prohibitions on excessive private benefits, clearer rules for 
appraisals required to substantiate tax deductions for charitable contributions, and new 
rules to ensure that assets held in donor-advised funds and supporting organizations are 
used to benefit the intended charitable purposes.”). 
41 I.R.C. § 170(f)(16) Contributions of clothing and household items. 
(A) In general.—In the case of an individual, partnership, or corporation, no 
deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any contribution of clothing 
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charitable deduction only if the condition of the clothing or household 
item is at least considered good.  “The Secretary is authorized to deny 
by regulation a deduction for any contribution of clothing or a 
household item that has minimal monetary value, such as used socks 
and used undergarments.”42  While somewhat comical, almost 
worthless property costs the government a hefty amount, more than 
 
or a household item unless such clothing or household item is in good used 
condition or better. 
(B) Items of minimal value.—Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the Secretary 
may by regulation deny a deduction under subsection (a) for any contribution of 
clothing or a household item which has minimal monetary value. 
(C) Exception for certain property.—Subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall not apply 
to any contribution of a single item of clothing or a household item for which a 
deduction of more than $500 is claimed if the taxpayer includes with the 
taxpayer’s return a qualified appraisal with respect to the property. 
(D) Household items.—For purposes of this paragraph— 
(i) In general.  The term “household items” includes furniture, furnishings, 
electronics, appliances, linens, and other similar items. 
(ii) Excluded items.—Such term does not include— 
(I) food, 
(II) paintings, antiques, and other objects of art, 
(III) jewelry and gems, and 
(IV) collections. 
(E) Special rule for pass-thru entities.—In the case of a partnership or S 
corporation, this paragraph shall be applied at the entity level, except that the 
deduction shall be denied at the partner or shareholder level. 
See also George K. Yin, JCT Chief Discusses the Tax Gap, 107 TAX NOTES 1449, 1451 
(June 13, 2005) (“In the case of used clothing and household goods, the relatively small 
value of each individual item contributed makes it extremely unlikely that the IRS will 
ever challenge the amount claimed as a deduction for such items.  Moreover, even 
taxpayers determined to be completely honest may tend to overvalue such items due to the 
attachment they may have to the item. . . . Under these circumstances, it seemed that the 
proper amount of deduction for such items is probably just a hope and a prayer.  The staff 
decided that if compliance in this case was really just a hope and a prayer, then at least the 
potential amount of error should be capped [at $500].”). 
42 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 2006 GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 40, at 
599 (“[T]he President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform and the staff of the Joint 
Committee on Taxation both have concluded that the fair market value-based deduction 
for contributions of clothing and household items present difficult tax administration 
issues, as determining the correct value of an item is a fact intensive, and thus also a 
resource intensive matter.”).  Many should recall that President and Mrs. Clinton took a 
charitable deduction for their old underwear.  See David Cay Johnston, Spending It; It 
Takes a President to Overpay the I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1998 (“When he was 
Governor of Arkansas, Mr. Clinton deducted $2 for each pair of used underwear he gave 
to the Salvation Army.”); Stephen Labaton, Clinton Taxes Laid Bare, Line by Line, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 16, 1994, at A8. 
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$9 billion in 2003 alone.43  With excessive deductions from the 
taxpayer, the benefits to her are much greater than either the benefits 
to the charity or the loss to the government. 
Likewise, in 2006, abuses involving donor advised funds, such as 
donor private benefit misuse of funds,44 prompted legislation.45  The 
study of donor advised funds, also required by that legislation,46 may 
stimulate further corrective measures regarding these charitable 
gifts.47 
The IRS has tried to stem the use of charities as complicit 
accommodation parties in certain tax schemes.  The government uses 
the term “accommodation party” in this context to define a tax-
 
43 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 2006 GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 40, at 
599. 
44 2004 Hearings (statement of the Hon. Mark Everson, Commissioner, IRS, 
Washington, D.C.), supra note 25, at 15 (“We have seen abuses in this area, both in 
examinations and in applications for exemption from new organizations. . . . In addition, 
we are aware that some promoters encourage clients to donate funds and then use those 
funds to pay personal expenses, which might include school expenses for the donor’s 
children, payments for the donor’s own ‘volunteer work’, and loans back to the donor.”); 
2004 Hearings (statement of Diana Aviv, President and CEO Independent Sector), supra 
note 25, at 19 (“[T]he Council on Foundations’ Proposal to Strengthen the Legal 
Framework of Donor-Advised Funds, based on extensive work by its Community 
Foundations Leadership Team, recommends the development of a ‘bright line’ test to 
prevent compensation and other inappropriate financial benefits to donors, their advisors, 
or their family members; clarification of the distribution rules and requirements for donor-
advised funds; and increased penalties for violations of the rules governing donor-advised 
funds.”). 
45 2006 PPA, supra note 40, §§ 1231(a), 1234(a), 1234(b), 1234(c), 120 Stat. 1081, 
1082, 1095, 1100–01, enacting I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(18), 4966, 2522(c)(5), 2055(e)(5).  
Section 170(f)(18) provides: 
A deduction otherwise allowed under subsection (a) for any contribution to a 
donor advised fund (as defined in section 4966(d)(2)) shall only be allowed if— 
(A) the sponsoring organization (as defined in section 4966(d)(1)) with 
respect to such donor advised fund is not— 
(i) described in paragraph (3), (4), or (5) of subsection (c), or 
(ii) a type III supporting organization (as defined in section 
4943(f)(5)(A)) which is not a functionally integrated type III supporting 
organization (as defined in section 4943(f)(5)(B)), and 
(B) the taxpayer obtains a contemporaneous written acknowledgment 
(determined under rules similar to the rules of paragraph (8)(C)) from the 
sponsoring organization (as so defined) of such donor advised fund that such 
organization has exclusive legal control over the assets contributed. 
46 The 2006 legislation required a study to be conducted on both donor advised funds 
and supporting organizations.  See I.R.C. § 1226; I.R.S. Notice 2007-21, 2007-9 I.R.B. 
611, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-07-21.pdf (last visited July 20, 2009). 
47 See, e.g., http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2008/Jan/DonorAdvised 
FundsPreparingforCloserScrutiny.htm (last visited July 20, 2009). 
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exempt organization’s participation in a transaction that is intended to 
secure tax benefits for a taxable third party.48  In 2004, IRS 
Commissioner Mark Everson described two such schemes involving a 
charity as an accommodation party: 
The first example is a transaction in which taxpayers donate 
offsetting foreign currency option contracts to a charitable 
organization to trigger a loss deduction while avoiding taxation on 
corresponding gain.  The second example involves the purported 
transfer of S corporation nonvoting stock by a taxpayer to a tax-
exempt entity in an attempt to shield income from taxation while 
allowing the taxpayer to retain the economic benefits of 
ownership.49 
According to him, the cost of the first type of abuse may be more 
than $1 million for each such transaction; the cost of the second he 
estimated to entail “the reallocation of hundreds of millions of dollars 
from shareholders to tax-exempt accommodation parties.”50  The IRS 
has listed both types of tax schemes as transactions requiring 
disclosure.51 
Finally, Congress and the courts have attacked the role of charities 
in split-dollar insurance arrangements.  In Addis,52 the Ninth Circuit 
pointed to the taxpayers paying $36,000 to National Heritage 
Foundation (“NHF”) as an incentive for them to consent to a split-
 
48 2004 Hearings (statement of the Hon. Mark Everson, Commissioner, IRS, 
Washington, D.C.), supra note 25, at 9. 
49 Id. at 10. 
50 Id. at 11. 
51 See I.R.S. Notice 2003-81, 2003-51 I.R.B. 1223, modified by Notice 2007-71, 2007-
35 I.R.B. 472; Reg. § 1.6664-2 (c)(5), Ex. 1, 2; I.R.S. Notice 2004-30, 2004-17 I.R.B. 828 
(“This notice alerts taxpayers and their representatives that these transactions are tax 
avoidance transactions and identifies these transactions, and substantially similar 
transactions, as listed transactions for purposes of § 1.6011-4(b)(2) of the Income Tax 
Regulations and §§ 301.6111-2(b)(2) and 301.6112-1(b)(2) of the Procedure and 
Administration Regulations”); 2004 Hearing (statement of the Hon. Mark Everson, 
Commissioner, IRS, Washington, D.C.), supra note 25, at 13 (“In Notice 2004-30, we 
designated the S Corporation Transaction as a listed transaction and for the first time 
exercised our authority under the return disclosure regulations to designate specifically the 
tax-exempt accommodation party as a ‘participant’ for purposes of those regulations.  As a 
participant, the accommodation party must comply with the disclosure requirements.”). 
52 Addis v. Comm’r, 374 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’g, 118 T.C. 528 (2002); see also 
Weiner v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (CCH) 1874 (2002) (The court denied the taxpayer a 
charitable deduction for amounts that were actually charitable split-dollar insurance where, 
contrary to the substantiation requirement of section 170(f)(8), the charity did not disclose 
in the taxpayer’s receipts the quid pro quo he received from the charity’s paying life 
insurance premiums for policies wherein he or his family would receive some of the death 
benefits.). 
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dollar insurance agreement with terms that disproportionately 
benefited the taxpayers (their quid pro quo): 
[T]he split of investment returns compared to investment outlays 
was remarkably uneven.  For twelve years, the NHF would put up 
90% of the investment corpus but be entitled to none of the gains 
from the projected positive investment performance exceeding the 
NHF’s guaranteed $557,280 in death benefits if Cindi Addis should 
die.  If the Addises [exercised their unilateral power to] surrender[] 
the policy, the NHF would get back just the amounts it paid in, less 
the cost of its share of the death benefit—and with no compensation 
for lost interest and other investment value. 
 The Addises put up only 10% of the investment corpus but were 
entitled to all the projected gains in cash value and death benefit 
amount less the NHF’s fixed $557,280 share of the death benefit or 
the return—without interest—of the NHF’s premium outlays 
exceeding the cost of the NHF’s share of the death benefit.53 
Without the $36,000 payment, NHF would not have been 
interested in this lopsided agreement.  The court held that because the 
taxpayers did not comply with the statutory consideration disclosure 
requirement,54 they were not entitled to a charitable deduction.55  
According to the legislative history of the disclosure statute, as a 
prerequisite for their charitable deduction, the taxpayers had the 
responsibility for securing substantiation from the NHF for the quid 
pro quo they had received for their contribution.56 
NHF stopped participating in split-dollar insurance transactions 
when Congress enacted additional legislation57 imposing a 100% 
 
53 Addis, 374 F.3d at 885–86 (“The split-dollar agreement gave the Addises ownership 
of the remaining projected gain of close to a million—nearly twice the NHF’s fixed share 
of the death benefit even though the NHF paid nine times more of the annual policy 
premium.  After twelve years, the Addises would also own and be able to borrow on a 
disproportionate share of the projected cash value of the policy.”). 
54 I.R.C. § 170(f)(8) (2006); see supra note 22. 
55 Addis, 374 F.3d at 881. 
56 Id. at 885 (citing H.R. REP. 103-213, at 563–64 (1993) (Conf. Rep.)).  The Tax Court 
had held that the taxpayers’ receipts contained misstatements because the documents 
claimed that they received no consideration for their charitable transfer despite the fact that 
“they expected the NHF to make premium payments on a policy that would provide 
‘substantial benefits’ to [the taxpayers’] trust.”  Id. (citing Addis v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 528, 
536 (2002)). 
57 Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, 
Title V, §§ 532(c)(1)(A), (B), 537(a), 113 Stat. 1930, 1936 (1999).  This Act enacted 
section 170(f)(10), which provides, in part, that: 
Nothing in this section or in section 545(b)(2), 556(b)(2), 642(c), 2055, 
2106(a)(2), or 2522 shall be construed to allow a deduction, and no deduction 
 1150 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 1133 
penalty on any charity’s involvement in those arrangements.58  
Congress enacted the legislation to halt the proliferation of the 
“abusive scheme” of charitable split-dollar life insurance.  The 
taxpayers’ contribution, for which they take a charitable deduction, is 
the cost of premium payments for insurance for them while the 
proceeds primarily benefit their family members.59  Congress wanted 
the promotion of those transactions exploiting the charitable 
deduction to cease immediately.  “The Committee is also concerned 
that the charity . . . serves merely as a conduit or accommodation 
party, which the Committee does not view as appropriate for an 
organization with tax-exempt status.”60 
 
shall be allowed, for any transfer to or for the use of an organization described in 
subsection (c) if in connection with such transfer— 
(i) the organization directly or indirectly pays, or has previously paid, any 
premium on any personal benefit contract with respect to the transferor, or 
(ii) there is an understanding or expectation that any person will directly or 
indirectly pay any premium on any personal benefit contract with respect to 
the transferor. 
(B) . . . For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term “personal benefit contract” 
means, with respect to the transferor, any life insurance, annuity, or endowment 
contract if any direct or indirect beneficiary under such contract is the transferor, 
any member of the transferor’s family, or any other person (other than an 
organization described in subsection (c)) designated by the transferor. 
58 Section 170(f)(10)(F)(i) provides: 
There is hereby imposed on any organization described in subsection (c) an 
excise tax equal to the premiums paid by such organization on any life insurance, 
annuity, or endowment contract if the payment of premiums on such contract is 
in connection with a transfer for which a deduction is not allowable under 
subparagraph (A), determined without regard to when such transfer is made. 
59 H.R. REP. NO. 106-19 pt. 2 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 H.R. REP.], available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cp106/cp106query.html (search “African Growth”; then follow link 
4 “African Growth and Opportunity Act” part 2) (African Growth and Opportunity Act, 
Section 19: Denial of Charitable Contribution Deduction for Transfers Associated with 
Charitable Split-Dollar Insurance Arrangements (June 17, 1999)); S. REP. NO. 106-54, at 
27–28 (1999); Affordable Education Act of 1999, S. 1134, 106th Cong., § 406  (1999), 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c106:1./temp/ 
~c1060nZWDY:e43117:pcs.html. 
60 1999 H.R. REP., supra note 59, § 19. 
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III 
THANK YOU GIFTS AND SALES BY OTHER NAMES 
A.  Thank You Gifts 
The easiest example of a quid pro quo gift to charity is the token 
“thank you” gift from a charitable organization after making a cash 
donation.  For example, a taxpayer receives a $5 coffee mug from the 
charity for a $50 contribution resulting in a net gift of $45.  When the 
taxpayer takes a deduction of $45, the tax benefit results in a tax 
savings to her of that amount multiplied by her tax bracket, which 
assuming the current maximum income tax rate of 35%,61 results in 
her benefiting to the extent of $15.75.  A synopsis of this simple 
transaction reveals that the taxpayer has purchased a $5 mug from the 
charity and has $15.75 in her pocket rather than mailing that amount 
to the IRS; the charity has $45 plus whatever profit it made on the 
sale of its “thank you gift” since the mug is valued at fair market 
value, the total of which is available for the charity to use for its 
exempt purpose; and the government has $15.75 less in revenue.  
Even if multiple zeroes are added to those dollar figures, the 
government’s loss and the taxpayer’s gain are both much less than the 
benefit to the charity, and so this quid pro quo charitable donation is 
acceptable under the U.S. Supreme Court’s model in American Bar 
Endowment and under traditional tax theories justifying the charitable 
deduction.62 
B. Entrance Fees 
Another type of “coffee mug” is the conditional gift to charity, 
which is really purely a commercial transaction.63  Specifically, in 
order to gain entrance into a nursing home, a charity may require the 
taxpayer to make a donation.64  A 1972 revenue ruling presented a 
fact pattern wherein all with means had to make a “sustainer’s gift” 
on admission to the nursing home; the amount of that donation varied 
by the size of the apartment and the payments were applied to debt 
retirement.  The IRS determined that if the transfer to the nursing 
 
61 I.R.C. § 1(i)(2) (2006). 
62 See Andrews, supra note 12. 
63 There are other types of conditional gifts, such as those conditioned on survivorship: 
“If A reaches her 25th birthday, the trust shall pay A $1K and make a $1K donation to the 
Red Cross.” 
64 Rev. Rul. 72-506, 1972-2 C.B. 106. 
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home is either plainly or de facto required for entrance, there is no 
donation to the charity and the required payment is purely a sales 
transaction between the supposed donor and the charity.65 
Taxpayers in a more recent private letter ruling attempted to 
distinguish themselves from the 1972 revenue ruling.66  The 
taxpayers asserted that they were not required to make a donation as a 
prerequisite for admission to the nursing home, their benefit was 
limited to a monthly rental surcharge waiver, and they had made a net 
gift to the extent of the excess value of their payment over the present 
value of the surcharge waiver over their lifetimes.  The IRS rejected 
the taxpayers’ position and held that they were not entitled to a 
charitable deduction for their payment to the nursing home because 
they obtained certain preferential rights regarding their unit in 
exchange.67 In addition, there was a refund feature of the full value of 
the payment available to a donor that, whether or not the taxpayers 
waived it, is indicative of a quid pro quo transaction under both 
Hernandez and American Bar Endowment.  Thus, the IRS ruled those 
factors create a strong presumption that the exchange was an even 
one.68 
On the other hand, there is case law including Wardwell69 and 
Dowell70 that has held the payment of a nursing home entrance fee 
was eligible for a charitable deduction.  In Wardwell, an invalid with 
Parkinson’s disease made a large donation to the facility’s building 
fund only one day before she was accepted for residence in the 
home’s infirmary.  In exchange for her $7500, the amount required 
“to endow a room in the newer West Building,” she or her designee 
 
65 Id.; see also Sedam v. United States, 518 F.2d 242, 245 (7th Cir. 1975) (payments 
made to secure mother’s room and admission to nursing home). 
66 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-23-001 (Aug. 23, 1993), 1993 PLR LEXIS 2736. 
67 Id. at *11–12 (“By putting themselves on the donor list, the Taxpayers expanded their 
options significantly, and by donating they guaranteed occupancy of a unit with the 
location, type, and size they desired, without subjecting themselves to the uncertainty of 
the non-donor waiting lists. . . .  Second, by making the payment as ‘original donors’ of a 
unit under construction, the Taxpayers were able to review the plans and customize the 
cottage to their liking. . . .  Third, by making the payment, the Taxpayers obtained the right 
for a surviving spouse to continue to occupy the unit for his or her lifetime, at single-
occupant rates.”). 
68 Moreover, the government determined that the taxpayers failed the second 
requirement that any surplus was paid with a donative intent.  Id. at *13–14. 
69 Estate of Wardwell v. Comm’r, 301 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1962), action on dec., 1974-
492 (Apr. 16, 1974). 
70 Dowell v. United States, 553 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1977), action on dec., 1977-83 
(June 16, 1977). 
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was allowed to have a nameplate placed on a room and to occupy the 
room, if available.71  However, she did not receive any property rights 
for her donation.  On the date she executed a room rental agreement 
with the home, she agreed to pay $7500, but this payment was 
actually made the day before she moved into the home.  The 
government’s deficiency notice denying her a charitable deduction for 
that amount stated, “The payment to Friendship Haven, Inc., entitled 
Mrs. Wardwell to preferred treatment as to the availability of a 
residence room and is now allowing her to live in this institution at a 
rate which is lower than persons not making a room endowment.”72  
The Eight Circuit reversed the Tax Court, which held that the 
payment was a quid pro quo arrangement, and held that since the 
government had not proved a direct connection between the 
taxpayer’s payment and her admission status, the court would not 
make an inference from the timing of the contribution.  Because her 
payment pledge constituted a binding legal obligation under local law 
“regardless of any . . . motive, or expectation that she might then have 
had in mind as to her admission into Friendship Haven, Inc.”73 and 
the pledge occurred one year before she had intended to move into the 
nursing home, the court held that the government was confusing 
motive with consideration when it denied her the deduction.74  
However, the donor’s motive is central to donative intent which, at 
least since American Bar Endowment, is a requirement for the 
charitable contribution deduction. 
Likewise, in Dowell the taxpayers made a “sponsorship gift” of 
$22,500 to the parent company of Oral Roberts University, Inc., and 
University Village, Inc.75  Dowell testified that her objective was to 
 
71 Wardwell, 301 F.2d at 634. 
72 Id. at 635 (emphasis omitted). 
73 Id. at 636. 
74 Id. at 637–38.  The court also noted that the home accepted patients in need who did 
not have the financial resources to make such a pledge.  Id. 
75 The taxpayers had met with a representative of the Village who testified that he had 
told them about the “sponsorship gift” that was requested in all instances but not a pre-
requisite for residency.  One month after her gift, the Dowells moved into a cottage at 
University Village and signed a rental agreement, providing also for the health care of Mr. 
Dowell.  Dowell, 553 F.2d at 1235–36.  University Village’s brochure states “that while a 
‘sponsorship gift’ is not a prerequisite for residency, it is requested [and] that a 
‘sponsorship gift’ does not entitle the donor to any ‘property rights.’”  Id. at 1236.  
However, 89% of sponsorship gifts were from residents and the remaining 11% were from 
their friends and relatives as well as from nonresidents.  The vast majority of the residents 
gave the suggested amount for the particular housing they selected.  More than half 
(twelve out of nineteen) of the residents moving from the Village received full or partial 
 1154 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 1133 
obtain housing and treatment for her husband in the Village, but she 
made the “sponsorship gift” only because she wanted to make a 
donation “out of charity and generosity” and not for any benefit she 
might receive in return.76  The circuit court emphasized the role of 
donative intent and held that the trial court’s finding of the taxpayer’s 
intention to make a gift was not clearly erroneous.77  The court held 
that there was no evidence of a quid pro quo in Dowell despite the 
facility’s advertising brochure, discussions, and statistics all reveal 
that, except for the very few who cannot afford to make such a 
payment, the entrance fee was a de facto requirement for admission to 
the Village.  After the transfer, the nursing home had $22,500 that 
they would have inevitably received on the Dowells’ admission to the 
facility; the Dowells received a tax benefit of $22,500 multiplied by 
their tax bracket for 1956; and the government lost that same amount 
in revenue. 
Wardwell and Dowell are pre-American Bar Association cases and 
may be viewed as aberrations in construing quid pro quo facts as 
indicative of a charitable donation.  However, recently a scholar cited 
those cases as examples of nonearmarked funds qualifying for a 
charitable deduction and so they still might have some vitality.78 
C.  Litigation Settlements and Awards 
Some legal disputes are avoided or resolved by a purported 
wrongdoer’s payment to a charity.  High tech companies,79 lying 
 
refunds of their gifts.  Almost one-quarter of the residents “either made no gifts, gifts of 
more than the suggested amount, or gifts of less” than the recommended amount.  Id. at 
1237. 
76 Id. at 1236–37. 
77 Id. at 1238.  The court contrasted Dowell with Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885 
(9th Cir. 1970), wherein “[t]he anticipated economic gain to the taxpayers was found to be 
the dominant factor or intent generating the conveyance.”  553 F.2d at 1239. 
78 See Buckles, supra note 12, at 1251 & n.35 (“However, several courts have upheld a 
deduction if the taxpayer presented credible evidence that the non-earmarked donation was 
not made with the expectation of receiving a material economic benefit in return for the 
contribution, even though the taxpayer or her family would likely benefit to some degree 
from the contribution.”). 
79 Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco, J.C.C.P. No. 4106, Microsoft 
Settlement Agreement, 31 (June 16, 2003), available at http://www.microsoftcalsettlement 
.com/PDF/SettlementAgreement.pdf (“The purpose of the cy pres program is to benefit 
public schools in California at which a substantial percentage of the attending students 
come from low-income households.”).  The maximum value of all claims settled by that 
agreement, which includes those payments to California public schools, was $1.1 billion.  
Id. at 17. 
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authors,80 billionaires,81 gas franchises,82 and even Sara Lee83 have 
agreed to make “gifts to charity” in what is increasingly viewed as a 
win-win type of conflict resolution.  It is only the government who 
loses revenue when a quid pro quo transfer to a charity poses as a 
qualifying charitable deduction. 
A popularized instance of this type of conditional payment is the 
resolution of several class action suits in different jurisdictions against 
Microsoft that included the company making a charitable transfer.84  
 
80 Motoko Rich, Publisher and Author Settle Suit over Lies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006, 
at E1 (“James Frey, the author who admitted making up portions of his best-selling 
memoir, ‘A Million Little Pieces,’ and his publisher, Random House, have agreed in 
principle on a settlement with readers who filed lawsuits claiming they had been 
defrauded. . . . [T]he settlement still has to be approved by a judge. . . . Under the terms of 
the agreement, which has been accepted by 10 of the 12 plaintiffs who are part of the 
consolidated case, both Mr. Frey and Random House will pay out no more than a total of 
$2.35 million, which includes the cost of refunding customers, lawyers’ fees for both sides 
and a yet-to-be-specified donation to charity.” (emphasis added)). 
81 Larry Ellison to Donate $100 Million to Settle Lawsuit, http://www.legalradar.com/ 
2006/06/larry-ellison-to-donate-100-million-to-settle-lawsuit.html (June 28, 2006) 
(“Oracle co-founder Larry Ellison will settle an insider trading lawsuit that he faces with a 
$100 million donation to his non-profit medical foundation.  However there are reports 
that the $115 million he had pledged to Harvard University last year has not yet been 
given.”); see also How Much Should High-Tech Give to Charity?, http://www.b-eye-
network.com/blogs/white/archives/2006/12/how_much_should.php (Dec. 29, 2006, 12:44 
PM). 
82 Eric Noe, Gas Station Owners Must Decide on Post-Katrina Gouging Charges: 
Business Owners Face Choice Between Charity Donation or Lawsuits, ABC NEWS (Jan. 
4, 2005), available at http://abcnews.go.com/Business/HurricaneKatrina/ 
story?id=1470445 (“The owners of 18 Illinois gas stations face a decision on Thursday: 
Admit to illegally raising prices at the pump after Hurricane Katrina and make a $1,000 
donation to charity, or declare their innocence and face the possibility of even bigger 
expenses in the form of a state lawsuit.”). 
83 Press Release, Center for Science in the Public Interest, Sara Lee Accused of Whole 
Grain Whitewash (Dec. 17, 2007), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/ 
200712171.html (“CSPI’s notification to Sara Lee says it wants the company to stop the 
misleading whole grain claims and to donate to charity the profits it has received from 
‘Soft & Smooth Made with Whole Grain White Bread’ that it has earned since its 
introduction in 2005.  Sara Lee has 30 days to respond to CSPI’s settlement offer.”). 
84 See, e.g., New York Outlines Options for Microsoft Class Action, PCMAG.COM 
(Apr. 12, 2006), available at http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1759,1948956,00.asp (“In 
addition, Microsoft agreed to give $5 million in cash and vouchers to the Minnesota Legal 
Aid Society.”); Robert W. Wood, Resolving Litigation by Payments to Charity, 109 TAX 
NOTES 633, 633 (Oct. 31, 2005) (arguing that there may be a distinction between a 
settlement and a judgment, in that with a settlement the plaintiff has no right to income 
until he signs an agreement relinquishing his rights).  In his article, Mr. Wood expressed 
caution about Larry Ellison’s agreement to pay $100 million to charity in order to resolve 
an insider trading lawsuit because such action would necessitate the approval of Oracle’s 
board of directors. 
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Because Microsoft lacks donative intent as required by American Bar 
Endowment and because it has received a benefit equal to the 
transferred amount (i.e., settling the litigation),85 the company is not 
entitled to any charitable deduction.  Because the majority agreed to 
the settlement, each plaintiff has taxable income in the value of her 
share of the donation.86  In theory, each plaintiff is entitled to a 
charitable donation deduction in that same amount.  However, if the 
plaintiffs parallel taxpayers, many of those plaintiffs in the class 
action suit do not itemize their deductions and therefore cannot take a 
charitable contribution deduction.87  It is unlikely that the plaintiffs 
were informed about their potential tax consequences relating to 
Microsoft’s “donation” before they voted in favor of the settlement 
agreement. 
While the charity will benefit in the payment amount, Microsoft 
should not benefit (at least not as a charitable deduction88), the 
plaintiffs should not benefit unless they itemize, and, to the extent that 
Microsoft and the plaintiffs received unwarranted tax benefits, the 
government has lost revenue. 
D. Orphan Patents with Fees 
There should be a “Lemon Law” for certain charitable “gifts,” such 
as a company’s charitable contribution of an orphan patent riddled 
with high maintenance fees.  The purported donor would receive a 
 
85 This situation parallels the one in American Bar Endowment.  “The most logical test 
of the value of the insurance respondents received is the cost of similar policies.  Three of 
the four individual respondents failed to demonstrate that they could have purchased 
similar policies for a lower cost, and we must therefore assume that the value of ABE’s 
insurance to those taxpayers at least equals their premium payments.  Had respondent 
Sherwood known that he could purchase comparable insurance for less money, ABE’s 
insurance would necessarily have declined in value to him.  Because Sherwood did not 
have that knowledge, however, we again must assume that he valued ABE’s insurance 
equivalently to those competing policies of which he was aware.  Because those policies 
cost as much as or more than ABE’s, Sherwood has failed to demonstrate that he 
intentionally gave away more than he received.”  477 U.S. 105, 118 (1986). 
86 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006) (excluding only damages received on account of physical 
injury or illness). 
87 See supra notes 2–3. 
88 Assuming, however, that Microsoft improperly took a charitable deduction, the 
company would receive a tax benefit indirectly in a circumstance where it might not be 
able to take a business deduction for its payment to the plaintiffs unless that payment 
qualified as an ordinary and necessary trade or business expense.  See I.R.C. § 162 (2006).  
While the payment might qualify as a business deduction under section 162, that analysis 
is different from a determination of deductibility as a charitable donation under section 
170. 
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charitable donation deduction in the reported fair market value of the 
patent; at the same time, the company is relieved of a large financial 
burden that it transfers to the charity.  The quid pro quo involved in 
those transfers was that the donor gained a charitable deduction and 
the charity gained an asset that was more of a liability.89  “By the year 
2000, donees began to realize that some IP [donations] cost more in 
annual maintenance fees than their alleged value.  The University of 
Virginia, for example, ended up [losing] money on a donated patent 
valued at more than $7 million.”90  The charities ultimately demanded 
that the donor assist them with these maintenance fees as a condition 
for accepting the patent.91  In such a situation, that quid pro quo 
illustrates a negative benefit to the charity that should have denied the 
taxpayer a charitable deduction in the first instance. 
IV 
THE DOUBLE BENEFIT OF THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION AND A 
CAPITAL GAIN EXCLUSION 
Donors who give certain in-kind gifts92 to a charity in order to 
receive the double benefit of not recognizing capital gain on their 
donation, while at the same time receiving a charitable deduction in 
the full fair market value of their property, are financially adept.93  
 
89 MacBean, supra note 31, at ¶ 1, ¶ 5 (“For many corporations, donating ‘orphan 
patents’ and other intellectual property (IP) to tax-exempt entities is much more than just a 
philanthropic endeavor.  Tax deductions for these donations make them an effective means 
of cutting costs. . . . By the early 1990s . . . many corporations ‘were spending millions of 
dollars a year on [patent] maintenance fees,’ some of which were protecting orphan 
patents that were not even being used.  Consultants and company executives alike realized 
that prudent cost management required donating or abandoning these orphan patents.” 
(footnotes omitted) (third alteration original)). 
90 Id. at ¶ 10 (footnotes omitted). 
91 Id. (“A professor involved later commented that ‘[t]he bottom line is that it cost us 
money with no benefit.’”). 
92 Wilson, supra note 39, at 68 (“For Tax Year 2005, 25.4 million individual taxpayers 
who itemized deductions reported $48.1 billion in deductions for noncash charitable 
contributions. Of these taxpayers, 6.6 million reported $41.1 billion in charitable 
contributions on Form 8283, Noncash Charitable Contributions.”  That reporting 
requirement applies to in-kind gifts of more than $500.  See I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(11)(A)(i), 
170(f)(11)(B)). 
93 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-1(c)(1) (2008) allows the taxpayer to deduct the fair market value 
(“FMV”) of the property he donates to the charity, subject to the reductions required under 
section 170(e)(1).  This statute does not require any reduction for gifts of intangible 
personal property or real property that if sold would have produced long term capital gain 
as long as the property is donated to a section 501(c)(3) organization.  In addition, a 
taxpayer may receive, to a lesser degree, a double benefit when she sells property to a 
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Specifically, the statistics indicate that the wealthy often make gifts of 
appreciated stock to a charity to obtain both benefits.94  Congress’s 
preference for charitable gifts of appreciated property over cash gifts 
is inequitable as it disproportionately benefits wealthier donors.95  
This bias as aid primarily for wealthy donors is underscored by the 
removal of charitable gifts of appreciated property as an item of tax 
preference to compute the alternative minimum tax (“AMT”).96 
 
charity at an amount less than fair market value.  In a bargain sale to a charity, the 
taxpayer may deduct, as a charitable gift, the difference between the fair market value of 
the property and the amount realized by the taxpayer from the charity on the sale.  Thus, if 
the value is $100 and the taxpayer receives $60 from the charity, she has made a charitable 
donation of $40.  However, because her basis for that property must be adjusted under 
I.R.C. § 1011(b), if her basis in the property had been $50, her recomputed basis under that 
statute would be $30, requiring her to recognize $30 (rather than $10) of capital gain on 
the sale (i.e., $60 (amount she realized on the sale) – $30 (recomputed basis) = $30 rather 
than $60 – $50 (original basis)). If she had first sold the property for its FMV, she would 
have recognized a capital gain of $50 ($100 (amount realized if sold at FMV) – $50 
(original basis) = $50 gain); assuming she had made the same $40 contribution, that would 
have been the amount of her donation.  Thus, she has benefited to some degree by the 
bargain sale by not having to recognize an additional $20 of capital gain, despite that she 
has the same $60 left in her pocket. 
94 Wilson, supra note 39, at 68 (In 2005, corporate stock represented the largest 
donations and amounted to $16.3 billion.); see also Clotfelter, supra note 6, at 686–87. 
95 Subject to the restrictions outlined in supra note 88, the charitable deduction 
provision allows the taxpayer to deduct the date of gift fair market value of donated in-
kind property.  In 2005, for all groups of taxpayers with adjusted gross income (“AGI”) 
below $500,000, the aggregate cost of their donated property exceeded the aggregate fair 
market value.  For all groups of taxpayers with AGI at or above $500,000, the aggregate 
fair market value of their contribution, and the amount of their deduction, exceeded the 
aggregate cost of their donated property.  For those taxpayers with AGI at or above $10 
million, the aggregate cost of their in-kind donations was $1,934,100 while their aggregate 
fair market value was $13,628,634.  See Wilson, supra note 39, at 76, Table 1a.  Note, 
however, that “Not every donation has a donor cost.  The total donor cost is based on 8.9 
million out of 16.4 million donations.”  Id. at 80 n.1.  Assuming the under-reporting of 
costs is the same on a percentage basis for both wealthy and less wealthy taxpayers, these 
statistics validate the claim that wealthy taxpayers benefit more from the double deduction.  
Moreover, “Figure D shows that the percentage change in donations by AGI, in general, 
increased in the upper income groups (starting with those making over $1.5 million) and 
fell in the middle income groups. Those taxpayers with $10-million or more AGI 
increased their donation amounts by 36.5 percent, from $8.2 billion in Tax Year 2004 to 
$11.1 billion in 2005.”  Id. at 68. 
96 See 1993 Tax Act, supra note 22, § 13171(a) (deleting former section 57(a)(6) and 
redesignating former section 57(a)(7) as section 57(a)(6)).  The rationale for this change is 
that it will produce “an additional incentive for taxpayers to make charitable contributions 
of appreciated property” although no explanation is given regarding the preference for 
those types of donations over cash gifts to charity.  1993 H.R. REP., supra note 23, at 861.  
Prior to this legislation, the charitable deduction for AMT calculation purposes was 
disallowed to the extent the contributed property’s fair market value exceeded its basis.  
For 1991 or for gifts made before July 1, 1992, contributions of tangible personal property 
were exempt from this rule and for 1990, corporate AMT income was “increased by 75 
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The statutory preference for gifts of intangible personal property or 
real property is inexplicable, particularly when the donor’s gift is 
unmarketable.97  There are additional difficulties where the donor 
remains in control of her closely held business subsequent to her 
charitable gift of a minority interest in that company.98  The 
comparative benefits and losses among the donor, charity, and the 
government are askew and result from both the double benefit 
described in this section of the article and the problem of 
overvaluation.99  “Many taxpayers, in effect, are provided with the 
equivalent of a deduction equal to much more than 100 cents for each 
dollar of property value given to charity.”100 
On the other hand, the capital gains rates are currently remarkably 
low101 and net capital gains, except for collectibles, are no longer an 
item of tax preference themselves.102  To that extent, the value of this 
“double” tax benefit has diminished. 
V 
SPLIT-INTEREST GIFTS TO CHARITY 
A split-interest gift to charity refers to the division and donation of 
only part of that property to charity; that is, an interest in the same 
 
percent of the amount by which adjusted current earnings (ACE) exceeds AMTI 
(calculated before this adjustment).”  1993 H.R. REP., supra note 23, at 630–31. 
97 See Clotfelter, supra note 6, at 676 (“[H]eavy tax subsidies encourage taxpayers to 
contribute appreciated property instead of cash.”  While marketable assets do not create 
problems for a charity, that may not be true of gifts of less marketable property such as 
“real property, closely-held businesses, or works of art.”).  By contrast, the statutory 
preferences (1) for tangible personal property gifts that require them to be property that is 
consistent with the justification for the charity’s exempt status, I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(i); 
(2) for gifts to public charities over those to private foundations, I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(ii); 
and (3) for gifts of property that if sold would not have produced long term capital gain, 
I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A), are grounded in sounder tax policy. 
98 Clotfelter, supra note 6, at 688–89 (also noting that co-ownership with the donor 
“may thus have real effects on the range of activities carried out by nonprofit 
organizations”). 
99 See supra Part II. 
100 Yin, supra note 41, at 1450 (“[C]ash gifts are less susceptible to noncompliance than 
are gifts of property with uncertain values, and we see a rather odd outcome.  Under 
current law, the incentive structure encourages gifts that are most vulnerable to 
noncompliance, and in effect discourages gifts that are less vulnerable.”). 
101 I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006).  Capital gains are generally taxed at 15% although can be at 
0% for lower income taxpayers beginning in 2008. 
102 See I.R.C. §§ 1(h), 55(b)(3); Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, Title III, § 301(b)(3), 117 Stat. 752, 759 (2003). 
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property passes to both a charitable and a noncharitable recipient.103  
Besides making a gift to a charity, the donor may retain an interest or 
he may also give an interest in that property to a third party 
noncharitable beneficiary.104  Theoretically, this type of transfer is a 
version of a net gift.  The donor has either made only a partial transfer 
of his interests in the property (by keeping an interest for himself) or 
he has made two transfers: one to the charity for which he should be 
entitled to a charitable deduction to the extent of the benefit the 
charity receives; and the other to his family or other third party, which 
should be subject to transfer tax in the full value that the 
noncharitable beneficiary acquires.  However, because split interests 
are most often divided temporally into present and future interests in 
the same property, valuation is computed by means of the actuarial 
tables.105  It is therefore subject to manipulations inherent in 
employing those tables, particularly the overvaluation of the 
charitable interest and the undervaluation of the noncharitable 
transfer. 
Beginning in 1970, a donor who makes a split-interest gift to a 
charity is entitled to a charitable deduction only if she makes that gift 
in a specific form106 and courts interpret these statutory rules 
 
103 I.R.C. §§ 170(f), 2055(e), 2522(c). 
104 If the donor retains an interest, the trust is known as a grantor trust; if she makes a 
transfer to third persons, the trust is a nongrantor trust. 
105 Because the use of infrequently updated tables resulted in inaccuracies and 
exploitation, in 1988 Congress enacted section 7520.  See Technical and Miscellaneous 
Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 5031(a), 102 Stat. 3342, 3668 (1998); H.R. 
REP. 100-795, at 591 (1988) (“The tables used by the IRS in determining the value of 
annuities, life estates, terms of years, remainders and reversions use outdated interest and 
mortality assumptions.  The committee believes that updating these assumptions will result 
in more accurate valuation of such interests.”).  This statute requires that (1) partial 
temporal interests in property, such as life estates or reversions, be calculated by means of 
the actuarial tables, I.R.C. § 7520(a); (2) the tables themselves be updated every ten years 
to account for different mortality assumptions, I.R.C. § 7520(c)(3); and (3) the IRS publish 
monthly interest rates applicable to the valuation of these interests, I.R.C. § 7520(a)(2).  
The use of tables necessarily incorporates unreal assumptions (specifically, that today’s 
interest rate is relevant to the eventual payout of a particular investment) and relies on a 
large sampling of taxpayers for acceptable accuracy.  Interest rates will likely vary over 
the expected term although one interest rate will be used to determine the value of an 
interest under the actuarial tables, the principal’s growth during the term is ignored in the 
tables, and mortality assumptions will probably change during the interest’s term (hence, 
the requirement in section 7520(c)(3) for revision of the tables every ten years). 
106 The Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201, 83 Stat. 487, 526–62 
(1969) [hereinafter 1969 Tax Act]. 
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strictly.107  However, despite the goals of the 1969 legislation, the 
statutes have engendered their own opportunities for abuse.  The 
greatest distortion created by this legislation is the charitable lead 
trust (“CLT”).108  By use of this legitimate estate planning method, 
the taxpayer can obtain an overstated charitable deduction or an 
excessive tax-free gift to his relatives or friends. 
A.  The 1969 Legislation 
In 1969, Congress amended the income, gift and estate tax 
charitable deduction statutes to prevent an inflated charitable 
deduction resulting from the overvaluation of the charity’s interest in 
a split-interest gift.109  To receive a charitable deduction for a CLT 
where the income interest in the trust benefits a charity but the 
remainder interest has noncharitable beneficiaries, the donor’s 
transfer must be arranged as a charitable lead annuity trust (“CLAT”) 
or a charitable lead unitrust (“CLUT”).110  Likewise, to receive a 
deduction for a charitable remainder interest in trust where the income 
interest is held by a noncharitable beneficiary, the donor’s transfer 
must be structured as a charitable remainder annuity trust, a charitable 
remainder unitrust, or a pooled income fund.  To determine the donor 
or decedent’s charitable donation deduction when a split interest 
complies with the statute, the noncharitable interest is subtracted from 
the value of the property.  When a deduction does not follow the 
statutory requirements under the split-interest rules, no deduction for 
the amount benefiting the charitable recipient is allowed.111 
 
107 See Wendy C. Gerzog, The Strict Rules of Charitable Split Interest Gifts, 118 TAX 
NOTES 541, 542–44 (Jan. 28, 2008). 
108 A CLT is a split-interest gift to charity where the charity is given a present benefit 
and the donor or other noncharitable beneficiary receives a remainder interest in the 
property.  To be deductible, a CLT must be an annuity or unitrust and must satisfy the 
pertinent statutory requirements.  See I.R.C. §§ 170(f), 2055(e), 2522(c) (2006). 
109 H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, at 38–39 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 H.R. REP.]; S. REP. NO. 
91-522, at 86–88 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 S. REP.]. 
110 See I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(2)(B), 2055(e)(2)(B), 2522(c)(2)(B).  A CLAT requires a fixed 
annual payment to the charity; a CLUT pays the charity a fixed percentage of the fair 
market value of the trust as determined each year. 
111 See I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(2)(A), 2055(e)(2)(A), 2522(c)(2)(A); see also H.R. REP. NO. 
91-782, at 295–96 (1969) (Conf. Rep.); 1969 S. REP., supra note 109, at 86–92; 1969 H.R. 
REP., supra note 109, at 38–39.  Because the requirements for a deductible split-interest 
trust are complex, in 1984, Congress provided for the allowance of certain reformations in 
the trust instrument.  The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1022(a), 
98 Stat. 494 (codified as I.R.C. § 2055(e)(3)) (1984).  See H.R. REP. NO. 98-861, at 1242 
(1984) (Conf. Rep.) (“The House Bill provides a permanent rule permitting reformation of 
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Although the 1969 legislation was aimed at correcting abuses 
inherent in using the actuarial tables to value present and future 
interests in the same property,112 the words of the statute have been 
interpreted as applying to other types of split interests.113  For 
example, in Johnson the decedent created a trust to support his sisters, 
maintain certain family graves, and provide funding for the education 
of religious figures in the Catholic Church.  The estate contended that 
the decedent had not created a split interest, but three separate trusts 
with the one-third charitable purpose trust entitled to an estate tax 
deduction.114  Rejecting that interpretation, the Fifth Circuit held that 
the will “unambiguously designates the creation of one trust to serve 
three separate purposes, only one of which involves a charitable 
bequest. . . . [and thus] involves a classic split interest, where interest 
‘in the same property’ passes to both charitable and noncharitable 
beneficiaries.”115  Thus, the court held that the trust was not created 
or reformed in any of the three statutorily required trust forms and 
that, consequently, the decedent was not entitled to a charitable 
deduction for any interest in the trust.116  Most recently in Tamulis, 
 
charitable split-interest trusts if certain requirements are satisfied.  Under this provision of 
the house bill, the relative values of the charity and the noncharity interests in the trust 
may not vary by more than 5 percent as a result of the reformation.  Additionally, unless 
reformation proceedings are begun within 90 days after the due date of the federal estate 
tax return (or the first trust income tax return if no estate tax return is due), the trust must, 
as executed, provide for an annuity trust or unitrust amount. . . .  The Senate Amendment 
is the same as the House Bill, except the Senate Amendment also provides that a 
reformation is deemed to occur to the extent that, pursuant to trust provisions, property 
passes directly to a charity before the due date of the estate tax return.”).  Under section 
2055, to be a “qualified reformable interest,” either all payments must be expressed as 
specific dollar amounts or a fixed percentage of the fair market value of the trust property, 
I.R.C. § 2055(e)(3)(C)(ii), or a judicial proceeding must be initiated by “the 90th day after 
the last date (including extensions) for filing [the estate tax] return,” I.R.C. § 
2055(e)(3)(C)(iii)(I). 
112 See 1969 S. REP., supra note 109, at 1704 (“The rules of present law for determining 
the amount of a charitable contribution deduction in the case of gifts of remainder interests 
in trust do not necessarily have any relation to the value of the benefit which the charity 
receives.  This is because the trust assets may be invested in a manner so as to maximize 
the income interest with the result that there is little relation between the interest 
assumptions used in calculating present values and the amount received by the charity.”). 
113 See, e.g., Estate of Tamulis v. Comm’r, 509 F.3d 343, 345–46 (7th Cir. 2007), aff’g 
T.C. Memo. 2006-183; Galloway v. United States, 492 F.3d 219, 223–24 (3d Cir. 2007); 
Estate of Johnson v. United States, 941 F.2d 1318, 1321 (5th  Cir. 1991); Zabel v. United 
States, 995 F. Supp. 1036, 1052 (D. Neb. 1998). 
114 Johnson, 941 F.2d at 1319. 
115 Id. at 1320. 
116 Id.  Likewise, in Zabel, the district court rejected the estate’s contention that a trust 
that gave a 50% income interest and a 100% remainder interest to a charity was entitled to 
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the decedent, a Roman Catholic priest, wanted the vast majority of his 
wealth to benefit his diocese and he created a trust for this purpose.  
However, he also provided for nominal gifts to his relatives in the 
trust.117  While the trust operated as a charitable remainder unitrust 
and was described as such in the estate tax return, the Seventh Circuit 
denied the estate any charitable deduction holding that the decedent’s 
noncharitable bequests were not expressed according to the explicit 
terms of the statute and regulations, efforts at reforming the trust were 
insufficient, and the doctrine of substantial compliance did not 
apply.118 
 
a deduction equal to 50% of the principal of the trust.  The court held that this was a split-
interest trust, that it was not in one of the three prescribed forms for split-interest trusts, 
that it was not reformed according to rules of the statute, and therefore not deductible.  In 
Galloway, the decedent had left his property in trust to two charitable beneficiaries and to 
two noncharitable beneficiaries, with the first half to be distributed on January 1, 2006, 
one-fourth to each beneficiary, and the remaining half to be distributed in the same 
proportions ten years later, with the survivors taking their proportionate share at that later 
date.  492 F.3d at 220.  Concluding that there was no ambiguity in the statute and thus 
denying the estate a charitable deduction for the split-interest gift, the Third Circuit in 
Galloway held “[t]he Trust divides a single property between charitable and non-charitable 
beneficiaries, falling directly within the language of § 2055(e).”  Id. at 224.  Denying the 
estate a charitable deduction for the split-interest gift while acknowledging that the result 
was “unfortunate” since there was little opportunity for abuse, the court held that the 
statute refers to “any other interest” and hence, is not limited to trusts creating a remainder 
interest.  Id. 
117 Tamulis, T.C. Slip Op., at 3–4.  Tamulis created an inter vivos trust that provided at 
his death for the immediate payment of specific bequests to both charitable and 
noncharitable beneficiaries.  The trust also provided for certain conditional annual 
payments during the term of the trust, which was the greater of ten years or the joint lives 
of John and Mary, his brother and sister-in-law, in the following amounts: $5000 to John 
(or to Mary if John predeceased her) to assist them with current costs associated with the 
house; $5000 to Wanda, a niece, if she was “making reasonable progress in pursuit of a 
Ph.D. in education;” $1000 each to Erica and Melissa; $10,000 to Migel, a grandniece, 
until she graduated medical school; and the remaining net income equally to Erica and 
Melissa.  In comparison to several relatively minor noncharitable transfers, he donated 
approximately $1.5 million, the value of the remainder interest in the trust, to the Catholic 
Church. 
118 Tamulis, 509 F.3d at 345 (citing Prussner v. United States, 896 F.2d 218, 224 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (en banc)).  There was a statement on the decedent’s estate tax return describing 
the remainder as the “residue following 10 year term certain charitable remainder unitrust 
at 5% quarterly payments to two grand nieces,” Erica and Melissa Rodgerson, where 
during the term, the Trustee holds and operates pursuant to the terms and conditions of 
I.R.C. section 664 and attached to the return were applicable calculations.  Indeed, from 
2001 through 2004, the trust actually did distribute 5% of the January 2nd fair market 
value of the trust assets to the beneficiaries.  Tamulis, Tax Court Slip Op., at 5–6. 
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B.  Charitable Lead Trusts 
The split-interest charitable deduction statute is specific, clear, and 
strictly construed.  However, it does not obviate all manipulation 
involving split-interest transfers.  Indeed, the 1969 legislation has 
inadvertently provided taxpayers with a tax shelter.  The statute 
created CLTs and CLTs are often used in estate planning by those 
whose self-interest, rather than charitable intent, is overriding.119  
Universities and other charitable organizations court donors to create 
CLTs, particularly when interest rates are low, by appealing to the 
donor’s noncharitable goals of giving assets to family members free 
of transfer taxes.120  In 2006, the data showed $16.5 billion in end-of-
year total assets for CLTs in 2006, almost $6 billion more than in 
2000 and about a $1 billion increase from 2005.121 
CLTs are advantageous to reduce or eliminate gift or estate taxes 
on a large transfer to noncharitable recipients.122  By using a CLT 
 
119 See, e.g., KATHRYN G. HENKEL, ESTATE PLANNING AND WEALTH PRESERVATION: 
STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS ¶ 35.09 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont of RIA, abridged 
student ed. 2003).  “The plans are advertised to potential donors as a ‘powerful tool,’ as a 
device that results ‘in little or no taxes,’ and more.”  2008 S. Hearing, supra note 6, at 6 
(statement of Diana Aviv, President and CEO Independent Sector). 
120 HENKEL, supra note 119, at ¶ 35.01[3][a] (“The value of an annuity varies inversely 
with interest rates, so a lower interest rate will produce a higher charitable deduction, all 
other factors being equal.”).  See, e.g., BYU Marriott School, Charitable Lead Trust, 
http://marriottschool.byu.edu/giving/clt.cfm (last visited July 29, 2009) (“The real value of 
using a charitable lead annuity trust is that the original asset values receive a gift and estate 
tax deduction based on the value of the income stream given to charity.  Excess earnings 
and growth add to the value of the trust corpus. . . . At the end of the trust term, the trust 
terminates and all the assets in the trust, including growth, are transferred to your heirs 
without further gift or estate tax.”); The Charitable Lead Trust in Today’s Low-Interest 
Environment, http://alumniandfriends.uchicago.edu/atf/cf/{25C2541E-96EB-4E70-947F   
-ABA13CD89DCD}/CLT_OpportunitiesREV.pdf (last visited July 29, 2009) (“Recent 
interest rates are the lowest they have been in decades. . . . If you are charitably inclined, 
you can take advantage of low interest rates by using a charitable lead trust to make a gift 
to charity and a highly leveraged gift to family members at substantially reduced or no gift 
tax cost.”). 
121 Lisa Schreiber, Split-Interest Trusts, Filing Year 2006, 27, No. 3 STATISTICS OF 
INCOME BULLETIN 48, 61 (Winter 2007-2008).  For 2000, split-interest trusts contained 
“approximately $93.9 billion in book value end-of-year total assets.”  News Release, IRS, 
IRS Issues Spring 2003 Statistics of Income Bulletin (June 26, 2003).  While the vast 
majority of that was from charitable remainder trusts (“CRT”), “Lead trusts, which 
comprised only 4.0 percent of the total number of filers, held a surprising 11.5 percent of 
the total assets.”  Id.  That 11.5% represented approximately $10.8 billion in book value 
end-of-year assets.  Id. 
122 For example, “Dad transfers $1,000,000 in property to a CLAT with a ten year 
charitable term and an eight percent payout rate.  The property earns ten percent (after-tax) 
yearly, and the [section] 7520 rate at the time of the transfer is eight percent.  The 
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instead of making a direct gift of the remainder to family members 
without incorporating a charitable donation, more value passes to 
your family, free of transfer tax when the property actually grows or 
earns more than the section 7520 interest rate.123  An inter vivos CLT 
produces a gift tax deduction that leverages the gift.124  That is, where 
the value of the income interest that qualifies for the gift tax 
charitable deduction equals the value of the remainder that passes to 
the noncharitable recipient, the gift is “zeroed out.”125  To produce a 
sufficiently large income interest requires a very high income payout 
and/or a sufficiently long term of the CLT.  Thus, CLTs are most 
attractive to very wealthy families who can wait a long time for 
family members to possess the trust principal.126 
 
remainder interest is valued at $463,192 at the time of the transfer.  At the end of the 
charitable term, the value transferred to Dad’s children is $1,318,748.49.  Had Dad 
initially made a gift of property worth $463,192 rather than creating the CLAT, the gifted 
property would be worth $1,201,400.76 at the end of ten years, assuming it grew at ten 
percent (after-tax) each year.”  HENKEL, supra note 119, at ¶ 35.09.  As between a CLAT 
and a CLUT, “If the CLT property is expected to appreciate, a CLAT is usually the better 
choice, since the annuity remains fixed and more property can go to the family 
beneficiaries.”  Id. at ¶ 35.08. 
123 The section 7520 interest rate for a particular month is the rate rounded to the 
nearest two-tenths of one percent that is 120% of the applicable federal midterm rate 
(compounded annually) for the month in which the valuation date falls.  The IRS publishes 
the rates monthly.  See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2008-33, 2008-27 I.R.B. 1.  Table 5 contains the 
federal rate for determining the present value of an annuity, an interest for life or for a 
term of years, or a remainder or a reversionary interest for purposes of section 7520.  For 
July 2008, the rate was 4.2%.  Id. 
124 The principal benefits of a CLT are the transfer tax savings.  See supra note 122 and 
accompanying text.  A grantor CLT is a taxable trust for income tax purposes; while the 
grantor does not receive an income tax charitable deduction for the actuarial value of the 
charitable interest, she receives a charitable deduction for current distributions each year as 
the income is earned and paid to the charity.  That is particularly helpful either when the 
grantor has exceeded the percentage limitations of section 170(b) or when the trust assets 
produce dividend income that is currently taxed at 15% while the income tax deduction 
may offset her other income that is taxed at the maximum ordinary income rate of 35%.  
However, there is a recapture of those deductions if the grantor dies during the trust’s 
term.  A nongrantor CLT is not taxable and not deductible for income tax purposes.  It is 
the more popular type of CLT.  See HENKEL, supra note 119, at ¶ 35.03.  The promise of 
estate tax repeal in the 2001 Act inhibited the use of a testamentary CLT; however, the 
inter vivos trust remained popular.  See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
125 Some estate planners advise their clients to generate a small taxable gift in order to 
trigger the running of the statute of limitations on the transfer. 
126 “Consider the following example: 
Donor contributes $1 million to a charitable lead annuity trust that will make annuity 
payments to the University of Chicago for a term of years, after which the trust will be 
distributed in equal shares to Donor’s three children. 
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Because the taxpayer’s transfer tax is assessed when she makes her 
transfer to a CLAT127 and is not determined on a yearly basis, 
significantly appreciated assets may pass to the noncharitable 
beneficiary without further transfer tax liability. 
Consider, for example, an individual who deposits $1 million in a 
twenty-year charitable lead trust, and stipulates that the charity is to 
receive $70,000 in income annually, with the remainder going to his 
sons and daughters.  Using the statutory interest rate of 120% of the 
Federal Midterm Rate, the Treasury tables project the value of the 
donation as $777,500 and the remainder as $222,500, which is then 
taxed accordingly.  In this example, the trust principle [sic] actually 
grows to about $2.5 million because actual investment performance 
far outpaces the statutory rate (which was 3.6% for March 2008).  
Since the statutory interest rate is so low and the projected value of 
the remainder has already been taxed, the heirs receive more than $2 
million free of estate or gift taxes.128 
In this instance, the taxpayer has a substantial transfer tax savings 
equal to the extent of at least $900,000 ($2 million multiplied by the 
maximum gift tax rate (45%)).  In this scenario, the charity is deemed 
to have received $70,000 for twenty years, for a present discount 
value of $777,500.  Yet, if the trust fares poorly so that its income is 
actually below the statutory discount rate, the stated value of the 
charitable interest may not materialize and the charity may not receive 
 
If the charitable term is 20 years and the annuity payment to the University is 
$70,000/year, the charitable gift tax deduction will be equal to $1,000,000, meaning there 
will be zero taxable gift and no gift tax owed.  Compare this to the amount of taxable gift 
that results when the section 7520 rate is higher: 
Section 7520 Rate Taxable Gift 
2.0% (February 2009) $0 
7.2% (historic average of all rates to 
date 
$269,810 
Under this scenario, the University will receive an aggregate gift of $1,400,000 over 20 
years. In addition, assuming a 7.9% rate of return, the donor’s three children will receive 
an aggregate sum of $1,100,000, gift tax-free, at the end of 20 years.”  The Chicago 
Initiative, The Charitable Lead Trust in Today’s Low-Interest Environment, 
http://alumniandfriends.uchicago.edu/atf/cf/%7B25C2541E-96EB-4E70-947F-
ABA13CD89DCD%7D/CLT_OpportunitiesREV.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 2009). 
127 See, e.g., supra note 122. 
128 2008 S. Hearing, supra note 6, at 6 (statement of Diana Aviv, President and CEO 
Independent Sector). 
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a benefit equal to the amount of the taxpayer’s deduction.129  By 
means of the CLT, the taxpayer has saved $900,000 in gift or estate 
taxes, the charity may or may not receive the charitable donation 
amount ($777,500) allowed to the taxpayer,130 and the government 
has lost revenue to the extent of that $900,000 plus the value of the 
charitable deduction $349,875 ($777,500 multiplied by the 45% 
transfer tax rate) for a total projected revenue loss of $1,249,875.  
Therefore, the taxpayer benefits from a CLT to a much greater extent 
than the charity. Under an expanded application of quid pro quo, the 
taxpayer should be denied a charitable deduction.  By means of a 
CLT, the government has sustained a significant revenue loss that 
cannot be justified by the rationales for the charitable deduction.131 
VI 
GIFTS TO ONE’S OWN CHARITABLE FOUNDATION AND DONOR 
ADVISED FUNDS 
According to the IRS, one area of abuse involving charities is 
donor retained control over donated assets.132  While private 
foundations133 are subject to strict rules,134 “donors, nevertheless feel 
 
129 Id.  Of course, the benefits of transfer tax-free consequences of a zeroed-out grantor 
retained annuity trust (“GRAT”), while not as great as those of its charitable counterparts, 
are also unwarranted on the same basis that any shortfalls of income production do not 
result in a parallel detriment to the transferor.  See I.R.C. §§ 2702(a)(2)(B), 2702(b) 
(2006). 
130 If the asset performs and creates income in that amount, the charity will receive the 
full donation.  If the asset income exceeds that amount, that excess passes to the 
noncharitable beneficiary transfer tax-free. 
131 A CRT provides additional benefits to the taxpayer because of the use of the 
actuarial tables, the benefit of no capital gains tax on the sale of assets sold by the trust, 
and the charitable deduction; however, to gain those benefits, the CRT requires the 
noncharitable beneficiary to live a long life, a factor less predictable than those attached to 
a CLT.  See HENKEL, supra note 119, at ¶ 33.16.  With either a CLT or CRT, there is a 
risk that the asset may not perform as well as expected. 
132 2008 Dirty Dozen, supra note 5. 
133 A private foundation is contrasted with a publicly supported charity and is defined in 
I.R.C. § 509(a) (2006). 
134 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 2006 GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 
40, at 629 (“Because private foundations receive support from, and typically are controlled 
by, a small number of supporters, private foundations are subject to a number of anti-abuse 
rules and excise taxes not applicable to public charities.”).  See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 4941–4947 
(2006).  Also, donations of all types of capital gain property to private foundations are 
generally limited to a deduction in the amount of the donor’s basis instead of the 
property’s fair market value.  See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).  Many of those rules 
were enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, see 1969 Tax Act, supra note 106; 
1969 H.R. Rep., supra note 109, at 1665 (“[Y]our committee has concluded that even 
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the control they can exercise over a private foundation more than 
offsets the less favorable tax treatment a foundation receives.”135  
There are donors who make large contributions to their own, or their 
family’s, private foundation and without violating the rules against 
self-dealing, they control the identity of recipients or the amount of 
those gifts.136 
When a donor is unhappy with the administrative burdens and 
restrictions placed on private foundations and gifts to those 
organizations, a gift to a donor advised fund is an attractive 
alternative.137  Receiving a full deduction in the year the contribution 
 
arm’s-length standards often permit use of a private foundation to improperly benefit those 
who control the foundation.  This is true, for example, where a foundation (1) purchases 
property from a substantial donor at a fair price, but does so in order to provide funds to 
the donor who needs access to cash and cannot find a ready customer . . . . In order to 
minimize the need to apply subjective arm’s-length standards, to avoid the temptation to 
misuse private foundations for noncharitable purposes, to provide a more rational 
relationship between sanctions and improper acts, and to make it more practical to 
properly enforce the law, your committee has determined to generally prohibit self-dealing 
transactions and to provide a variety and graduation of sanctions . . . .”). 
135 JOHN R. PRICE & SAMUEL A. DONALDSON, PRICE ON CONTEMPORARY ESTATE 
PLANNING § 8.42.1, at 8–91 (CCH 2007 ed.). 
136 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 2006 GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 
40, at 629 (“Donors to private foundations and persons related to such donors together 
often control the operations of private foundations.”).  A private foundation can pay 
reasonable compensation to both the donor and his family if they are its directors or 
trustees.  I.R.C. § 4941(d)(2)(E) (2006). 
137 A “donor advised fund” is defined in I.R.C. § 4966(d)(2)(A) as 
Except as provided in subparagraph (B) or (C), the term “donor advised fund” 
means a fund or account— 
(i) which is separately identified by reference to contributions of a donor or 
donors, 
(ii) which is owned and controlled by a sponsoring organization, and 
(iii) with respect to which a donor (or any person appointed or designated by 
such donor) has, or reasonably expects to have, advisory privileges with 
respect to the distribution or investment of amounts held in such fund or 
account by reason of the donor’s status as a donor.” 
Under I.R.C. § 4966(d)(2)(B), that term 
shall not include any fund or account— 
(i) which makes distributions only to a single identified organization or 
governmental entity, or 
(ii) with respect to which a person described in subparagraph (A)(iii) advises 
as to which individuals receive grants for travel, study, or other similar 
purposes, if— 
(I) such person's advisory privileges are performed exclusively by such 
person in the person's capacity as a member of a committee all of the 
members of which are appointed by the sponsoring organization, 
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is made, the donor can then make nonbinding recommendations for 
distributions from the fund.138 
On 2005 federal income tax returns, the largest recipients of 
charitable donations were private foundations, receiving a total value 
of $9.8 billion.139  Further, donor advised funds, while representing 
only 3.9% of all itemized deductions in that year had the highest 
average per donation amount of $56,452, an increase of 60.4% from 
the previous year, for a total of $1.6 billion in 2005.140 
Incredibly, CEOs donate company stock to their family 
foundations immediately before a steep loss in their value while they 
retain powers to vote those shares because they are not subject to 
insider trading laws for charitable deductions.141  “Consistent with 
their exemption from insider trading law, I find a pattern of excellent 
timing of Chairmen and CEOs’ large stock gifts to their own family 
foundations. On average these gifts occur at peaks in company stock 
prices, following run-ups and just before significant price drops.”142  
 
(II) no combination of persons described in subparagraph (A)(iii) (or 
persons related to such persons) control, directly or indirectly, such 
committee, and 
(III) all grants from such fund or account are awarded on an objective 
and  nondiscriminatory basis pursuant to a procedure approved in 
advance by the board of directors of the sponsoring organization, and 
such procedure is designed to ensure that all such grants meet the 
requirements of paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of section 4945(g). 
See also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 2006 GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 40, 
at 635–44; 2004 Hearing (statement of the Hon. Mark Everson, Commissioner, IRS, 
Washington, D.C.), supra note 25, at 15 (“For example, a donor may contribute 
$1,000,000 to a donor advised fund and claim the whole amount as a charitable deduction 
for the year in which the contribution is made.  In future years the donor may advise the 
fund as to desired distributions to qualified beneficiaries (e.g., other charities).  In 
operation these funds allow considerable input from the donor but are not classified as 
private foundations.  Again, in a legitimate donor advised fund, the charity must have legal 
control over the donated funds and must have the right to disregard the donor’s advice.”). 
138 PRICE & DONALDSON, supra note 135, at § 8.4, at 8–90. 
139 Wilson, supra note 39, at 68, 71. 
140 Id. at 70–71. 
141 See David Yermack, Deduction ad absurdum: CEOs Donating Their Own Stock to 
Their Own Family Foundations 1 (2008), available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
department/Seminar/Spring%202008/Yermack%20Paper%20SSRN-id1096257.pdf 
(“Unlike open market sales, gifts of stock are generally not constrained by U.S. insider 
trading law, and company officers can often donate shares of stock to charities during time 
periods when selling the shares would be prohibited.  This exemption has evolved from a 
combination of federal caselaw, prosecutorial indifference, and recent amendments to SEC 
rules (Sulcoski, 1989).”). 
142 Id. at 2. 
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Professor Yermack suggests that the CEOs may well be backdating 
transactions and committing fraud,143 but he also castigates the family 
foundation that allows an immediate charitable deduction for the 
donation of stock but permits the CEO continued control over those 
shares.144  Not surprisingly, Professor Yermack concludes that “two 
groups may be systematically harmed by opportunistically timed 
stock gifts: taxpayers and charities. . . . “145  His data suggests that 
private foundations provide a great quid pro quo to the CEO donor: 
“[T]he immediate tax benefits to a donor CEO who contributes 
appreciated stock may easily exceed the discounted present value of 
charitable donations made by the foundation over time.”146  Thus, the 
benefit of the full current deduction the taxpayer receives may be 
greater than the benefit derived by the charities who may not receive 
the funds until future years.  Under quid pro quo analysis and 
American Bar Endowment, that CEO should not qualify for a 
charitable deduction. 
VII 
MISUSE OF DEFINED VALUE CLAUSES IN GIFTS TO CHARITY 
Defined value clauses are routinely used to split an estate into a 
marital deduction trust and a bypass trust.  Whatever exceeds the 
 
143 Id. at 4 (“While nominally transferring part of their fortunes to charitable 
foundations for civic purposes, many appear simultaneously to exploit gaps in the 
regulation of insider trading or even to backdate their donations to increase the value of 
personal income tax benefits.  The results loosely parallel a series of older tax fraud cases   
. . . .”). 
144 Id. at 4–5.  The facts indicate that the wealthy overwhelmingly choose family 
foundations as recipients of their charitable contributions.  These foundations irrevocably 
set aside assets for eventual donation to a charity, but trustees are only required to give 
those assets to the charities at an average rate of 5% per year.  In so doing, a wealthy 
taxpayer receives the same tax benefits as with an immediate transfer of those assets to a 
charity.  However, since many wealthy taxpayers and their families control foundations, 
they also benefit by retaining control over the choice of ultimate charitable recipient of 
those assets; as trustee, she can manage them and exercise their voting rights.  “This 
bundle of immediate tax benefits and continuing control rights appeals to many donors, 
especially top executives of public companies who usually hold large amounts of 
appreciated equity in their own firms.  Most family foundations in the sample, which are 
invariably controlled by the CEO and his family members as trustees, retain their donors’ 
stock gifts for long periods rather than diversifying their assets, as would generally be 
required if trustees followed the prudent man rule of investment management.”  Id. at 5. 
145 Id. at 28. 
146 Id. 
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unified credit against the estate tax147 at the decedent’s death passes 
to the marital trust.  There are no serious valuation issues in that 
instance because either the decedent’s property will not be subject to 
estate taxes because it qualifies for the unlimited marital deduction148 
or is exempt from tax because of the unified credit.  Further, Rev. 
Proc. 64-19149 deals with funding issues related to the two trusts so 
that neither trust will unduly benefit from appreciation or depreciation 
between the date of decedent’s death and the date the executor 
distributes the estate’s assets.  Because exemptions and the values of 
the estate’s assets vary between the date a testamentary document is 
executed and its effective date (i.e., decedent’s date of death), defined 
value clauses are drafted to allow for these fluctuations and can serve 
positive goals.  However, defined value clauses can also be used for 
more dubious purposes.  Specifically, defined value clauses can be 
used to sanction questionable valuation.  When a defined value clause 
is combined with a charitable transfer, it may produce abusive 
valuation and transfer tax distortions.  Invariably, this permutation 
creates a greater economic benefit for the donor than for the charity. 
The government objects to defined value clauses because they 
contravene several public policy directives, as enunciated in 
Procter.150  In Procter, a trust provided that a gift would revert to the 
donor if it was later determined that it would be subject to gift tax.  
According to the Fourth Circuit, such a clause flouts public policy: it 
(1) discourages the government’s tax collection by making futile the 
audit of returns, (2) renders the court’s decision moot by negating the 
 
147 See I.R.C. § 2010 (2006).  For decedents dying in 2008, the exemption amount is $2 
million and for 2009, $3.9 million.  I.R.C. § 2010(c).  The Economic Growth and Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, Title IV, § 501, 115 Stat. 38 (2001) 
[hereinafter EGTRRA], repealed the estate and generation skipping transfer taxes for the 
year 2010; however, under the sunset provision, in 2011 these taxes will reappear as they 
existed before the 2001 legislation.  EGTRRA, § 90. 
148 See I.R.C. § 2056(a) (2006), enacted by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, 
Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403, 95 Stat. 172, 302–03 (1981).  Section 403(a)(1)(A) repealed 
I.R.C. § 2056(c) (1954), which contained the dollar and percentage limitations placed on 
the deduction.  The adoption of the unlimited marital deduction and the married couple as 
the unit of estate and gift taxation has rarely been criticized by scholars or practitioners. 
149 1964-1 C.B. 682 (“The purpose of this Revenue Procedure is to state the position of 
the Internal Revenue Service relative to allowance of the marital deduction in cases where 
there is some uncertainty as to the ultimate distribution to be made in payment of a 
pecuniary bequest or transfer in trust where the governing instrument provides that the 
executor or trustee may satisfy bequests in kind with assets at their value as finally 
determined for Federal estate tax purposes.”). 
150 See Comm’r v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944). 
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gift the court has examined, and (3) disturbs a final judgment.151  
Likewise, when a charity is intermixed with the use of a defined value 
clause, by requiring any excess value over a fixed amount to pass to 
charity, the effect of that defined value clause is to increase the 
charitable deduction that would accompany and parallel an increased 
valuation of the decedent’s estate.152  If such additional value actually 
adhered to the charity’s benefit, the defined value clause might be 
considered benign despite that it would reflect the same public policy 
breaches found in Procter.153  However, what actually happens in the 
series of transactions that incorporate a defined value clause, a 
charitable gift, and the donee’s redemption of that gift is an 
exaggerated charitable deduction and an undervaluation of the 
donor’s noncharitable gift. 
McCord154 illustrates how a series of transactions incorporating a 
charitable gift have been used effectively to benefit the donors and 
their family more than the charity.  Judge Foley found that the taxable 
gift pursuant to the donors’ assignment agreement under Texas state 
property law was $6,910,933 and that allowable charitable deduction 
was $2,972,899 for a combined value of $9,883,832.155  The two 
charities allowed the noncharitable donees to purchase the charities’ 
interests they received from the donors for $479,008.156  Applying the 
 
151 Id. at 827. 
152 In Christiansen, the Tax Court recognized that such a defined value clause could 
create an opportunity for an estate to “lowball the value of an estate to cheat charities.”  
Estate of Christiansen v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. No. 1 (2008), slip op. at 28–29, 
available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/InOpHistoric/ESTOFCHRIS.TC.WPD.pdf. 
153 There was no abuse in Christiansen regarding the defined value clause in allowing 
the deduction to equal the value of the contribution to the foundation because the family 
limited partnership (“FLP”) discount was disallowed so that the donation consisted of the 
underlying value of the assets transferred to the FLP and not the heavily discounted and 
illiquid FLP interest.  Those liquid assets in Christiansen could easily be sold by the 
charity so that the donation would produce a benefit to the charity equal to the donated 
amount.  Because there are restrictions on marketability of interests in an FLP, the value of 
the interest is normally discounted.  Also, minority discounts may apply if the holder of an 
FLP interest owns only a minority share in the FLP. 
154 McCord v. Commissioner, 461 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 2006), rev’g and rem’g, 120 T.C. 
358 (2003). 
155 McCord, 120 T.C. at 418 (Foley, J., joined by Chiechi, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“Accordingly, pursuant to section 2501, the entire $9,883,832 transfer 
is subject to gift tax, and a charitable deduction is allowed for the $2,972,899 (i.e., 
$9,883,832 – $6,910,933) transferred to or for the use of the Symphony and CFT.”). 
156 Id. at 366 (“CFT and the symphony raised no objections to the value found in the 
HFBE letter and accepted $338,967 and $140,041, respectively, in redemption of their 
interests.”).  Those two charitable gifts combined equal $479,008. 
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total value of the donated partnership interest (i.e., the stated defined 
value clause plus the donated amount equaled $9,883,832)157 and 
working backwards since the charities received only $479,008, that 
excess value should have increased the value of the donors’ gift to 
their children and grandchildren to $9,404,824.158  That is, if the 
charities received only $479,008, the donees not only received more 
than the stated amount under the agreement, but also the donors 
received an unwarranted charitable deduction of approximately $2.5 
million and their children and grandchildren received approximately 
an additional $2 million not subject to transfer taxes.159 
In McCord, the circuit court refused to look at any transaction that 
occurred after the date of the gift,160 regardless how anticipated or 
planned those actions were;161 a very relevant post-gift event162 was 
 
157 I am adopting the amount that both the majority and Judges Foley and Chiechi used 
to value the aggregate value of the partnership interest that the donors transferred, without 
commenting on the methodology, the various discounts applied, or the issue of tax 
affecting the value of the gift.  The majority stated that this value was the total amount that 
the donors transferred to their family members and the charities.  Id. at 395 (“We conclude 
that the fair market value of each half of the gifted interest is $4,941,916 . . . .”  Twice that 
amount is $9,883,832).  Because the Fifth Circuit rejected the methodology of the Tax 
Court, adopted the figures of the petitioner’s expert, and allowed the donors’ gift to be tax 
affected, the appellate court’s valuation is far more generous than both the majority and 
the trial court judge’s opinion in the Tax Court.  “[T]he taxable value of the interests in 
MIL given by the Taxpayers to the Sons and the GST Trusts is not those determined by the 
Tax Court but are those determined and used by the Taxpayers . . . .”  McCord, 461 F.3d at 
632. 
158 Any time value of money or intervening event adjustments that need to be made 
should begin with this dollar figure. 
159 Logically, either the gift was greater than the donors had stated it would be or the 
donors retained that additional value.  The extent of the donors’ transfer was fixed and not 
at issue (“On January 12, 1996, petitioners assigned (as gifts) their partnership interests in 
MIL (the gifted interest).”).  McCord, 120 T.C. at 367.  And since the charity gained only 
$479,008 in a foreseeable transaction, the donors must have transferred $9,404,824 to the 
donees.  To this extent, the government was correct in stating that “the formula clause in 
the assignment agreement, designed to neutralize the tax effect of any upward adjustment 
to the valuation of the gifted interest, is ineffectual.”  Id. at 369. 
160 McCord, 461 F.3d at 626 (“The core flaw in the Majority’s inventive methodology 
was its violation of the long-prohibited practice of relying on post-gift events.”). 
161 Likewise, the court refused to consider expected post-gift events when it concluded, 
“Specifically, the Majority used the after-the-fact Confirmation Agreement to mutate the 
Assignment Agreement’s dollar-value gifts into percentage interests in MIL.”  Id. 
162 Another relevant post-gift fact was the March 1996 Confirmation Agreement, as 
discussed in the Tax Court opinion in McCord.  The January 12, 1996, assignment 
agreement specifically refers to an agreement later to be entered into by the assignees to 
allocate their interests among themselves, i.e., the Confirmation Agreement executed by 
the donees in March 1996.  McCord, 120 T.C. at 365 (“The assignment agreement leaves 
to the assignees the task of allocating the gifted interest among themselves; in other words, 
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the sale by the charity to the donees that occurred shortly after the 
donors’ transfer of their family limited partnership interests to their 
children and grandchildren.163  To state that the charities made a bad 
bargain that was unforeseeable is an unreasonable supposition. 
Clearly, the lower court described the real world truth: “Suffice it 
to say that, in the long run, it is against the economic interest of a 
charitable organization to look a gift horse in the mouth.”164  
Charities will not complain about donations even in much smaller 
amounts than the donor has claimed as a charitable deduction; it is in 
the charity’s interest to be known as compliant in almost any 
transaction.  As anticipated, the charities did not hire their own 
valuation experts or otherwise act like an unrelated, disinterested third 
party.165  Moreover, it is a wonder that any charity would want to 
accept such an unmarketable interest as a FLP interest if the charity 
did not expect that it would soon be redeemed by the donors’ family 
members.166 
The assignment agreement clearly anticipated the June 26, 1996, 
sale of a partnership interest from a charity to the donees.  Thus, 
making the sale to them a relevant, post-gift event for the value of the 
donors’ charitable contribution and the valuation of the donors’ gifts 
 
in accordance with the formula clause, the assignees were to allocate among themselves 
the approximately 82-percent partnership interest assigned to them by petitioners. . . . In 
March 1996, the assignees executed a Confirmation Agreement (the confirmation 
agreement) allocating the gifted interest among themselves . . . .”). 
163 Id. at 366 (“On June 26, 1996, MIL exercised the call right with respect to the 
interests held by the symphony and CFT.  It did so pursuant to a document styled 
‘Agreement-Exercise of Call Option By McCord Interests, Ltd., L.L.P.’ (the exercise 
agreement).  The purchase price for the redeemed interests was based on a two-page letter 
from HFBE (the HFBE letter) previewing an updated appraisal report to be prepared by 
HFBE.  The HFBE letter concludes that the fair market value of a 1-percent ‘assignee’s 
interest in the Class B Limited Partnership Interests’ as of June 25, 1996, was $93,540.  
CFT and the symphony raised no objections to the value found in the HFBE letter and 
accepted $338,967 and $140,041, respectively, in redemption of their interests.”).  As 
Judge Laro stated in his dissent, joined by Judge Vasquez, “I do not believe that Congress 
intended that individuals such as petitioners be entitled to deduct charitable contributions 
for amounts not actually retained by a charity.”  Id. at 427. 
164 Id. at 373 n.9. 
165 See id. at 430 (Laro, J. joined by Vasquez, J., dissenting) (“[T]he charities never 
obtained a separate and independent appraisal of their interests (including whether the call 
price was actually the fair market value of those interests), . . . the charities agreed to 
waive their arbitration rights as to the allocation of the partnership interests . . . .”). 
166 Id. (“[W]hy a charity would ever want to receive a minority limited partnership 
interest, but for an understanding that this interest would be redeemed quickly for cash, 
and find relevant that the interest was subject to the call provision that could be exercised 
at any time.”). 
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on January 12, 1996.167  By exercising their rights under the 
partnership agreement, the donees paid $479,008 for the charities’ 
partnership interest.  Although the government stipulated that 
“[b]efore the call right was exercised, there was no agreement among 
Mr. or Mrs. McCord, the McCord brothers, the Symphony or CFT as 
to when such a buyout would occur or to the price at which the 
buyout would occur,”168 such a buyout was foreseeable169 and not a 
material change in circumstances that would make the later sale 
irrelevant to the value of the donors’ gift. 
The appellate court cited Ithaca Trust Co., Executor and Trustee v. 
United States170 as controlling its refusal to consider anticipated post-
gift events; however, I have maintained that Ithaca Trust does not 
proscribe such review.171  Ithaca Trust, a pre-1969 estate tax 
charitable deduction case,172 involved the role of facts in a valuation 
required to be based on actuarial tables.173  Specifically, the case 
involved the fact that the decedent’s widow to whom he had 
bequeathed a life estate, died soon after his own death.  Because she 
died before the estate tax return had to be filed, the true value of her 
 
167 461 F.3d at 617 (“MIL may purchase the interest of any [exempt donee] (i.e., a 
permitted assignee of a partnership interest that is a charitable organization that has not 
been admitted as a partner of MIL) at any time for fair market value, as determined under 
the partnership agreement (the call right).” (alteration original)). 
168 McCord, 120 T.C. at 423 (Foley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
169 The partnership agreement provided the following: “Partners may freely assign their 
partnership interests to or for the benefit of certain family members and charitable 
organizations (permitted assignees). . . .  MIL may purchase the interest of any ‘charity 
assignee’ (i.e., a permitted assignee of a partnership interest that is a charitable 
organization that has not been admitted as a partner of MIL) at any time for fair market 
value, as determined under the partnership agreement (the call right).”  Id. at 362–63. 
170 279 U.S. 151 (1929). 
171 See, e.g., Wendy C. Gerzog, Dealing with Post-Death Events, 116 TAX NOTES 1005 
passim (Sept. 10, 2007); Wendy C. Gerzog, McCord and Postgift Events, 113 TAX NOTES 
349, 350 (Oct. 23, 2006); Wendy C. Gerzog, Donovan and Davis: Two More Lottery 
Cases, 110 TAX NOTES 543, 546–47 (Jan. 30, 2006); Wendy C. Gerzog, Estate of Noble: 
Post-Death Sale Is the Best Indicia of Stock’s Value, 106 TAX NOTES 678, 679 (Feb. 7, 
2005); Wendy C. Gerzog, Annuity Tables Versus Factually Based Estate Tax Valuation: 
Ithaca Trust Re-visited, 38 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 745 passim (2004); Wendy C. 
Gerzog, The Lottery Cases and Ithaca Trust, 101 TAX NOTES 289 passim (Oct. 13, 2003); 
Wendy C. Gerzog, Ithaca Trust and Section 2053: Smith, McMorris, and O’Neal, 95 TAX 
NOTES 570, 570 (Apr. 22, 2002). 
172 See I.R.C. § 2055 (2006) (providing for an estate tax charitable deduction).  The 
rules regarding the deductibility of split-interest gifts to charity (i.e., donations that also 
have noncharitable beneficiaries either preceding or following the gift to charity) were 
significantly revised in 1969.  See supra Part V.A. 
173 See Ithaca Trust, 279 U.S. at 155. 
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interest was known after her husband’s death.  Because the charity 
actually received more than the value of its remainder interest, 
following the widow’s life estate, calculated by the actuarial tables,174 
the estate argued it was entitled to a larger charitable deduction. 
What I believe the court in Ithaca Trust said was that where 
valuation is based solely on calculations under the actuarial tables, all 
facts, except for those incorporated or necessary in the application of 
the tables,175 are irrelevant.176  Thus, where tables are mandated for 
valuation,177 the fact that the person who is the measuring life 
actually predeceases her life expectancy is extraneous information.178  
According to Ithaca Trust, “[t]empting as it is to correct uncertain 
probabilities by the now certain fact, we are of opinion that it cannot 
be done, but that the value of the wife’s life interest must be estimated 
by the mortality tables.”179 
 
174 While the post-death fact of the date of the decedent’s surviving spouse’s death was 
known by the time the estate had to file its estate tax return, the Court in Ithaca Trust 
required her interest to be valued by the actuarial tables regardless of the consequence that, 
in this particular instance—as is true with most particular instances that are calculated by 
actuarial valuation—the value of the interest computed by means of the tables would, in 
fact, be wrong because it did not reflect her actual earlier than average, premature death.  
Id. at 155. 
175 See Treas. Reg. § 20.7520-1(c) (1989) (regarding the interest rate and mortality 
component used in the tables). 
176 See Ithaca Trust, 279 U.S. at 155. 
177 Section 7520 provides: 
[T]he value of any annuity, any interest for life or a term of years, or any 
remainder or reversionary interest shall be determined— 
(1) under tables prescribed by the Secretary, and 
(2) by using an interest rate (rounded to the nearest 2/10ths of 1 percent) 
equal to 120 percent of the Federal midterm rate in effect under section 
1274(d)(1) for the month in which the valuation date falls. 
If an income, estate, or gift tax charitable contribution is allowable for any part of 
the property transferred, the taxpayer may elect to use such Federal midterm rate 
for either of the 2 months preceding the month in which the valuation date falls 
for purposes of paragraph (2).  In the case of transfers of more than 1 interest in 
the same property with respect to which the taxpayer may use the same rate 
under paragraph (2), the taxpayer shall use the same rate with respect to each 
such interest. 
178 The actuarial tables account for all individuals; by representing the average 
taxpayer, their calculations reflect those who survive, those who pre-decease, and their life 
expectancies. 
179 279 U.S. at 155.  Applying Ithaca Trust in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins 
Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 698 (1933), the U.S. Supreme Court stated, “The 
intention of the lawmakers was held to be that the computation of the tax should be made 
as of the death of the testator on the basis of a law of averages.”  See also Miami Beach 
First Nat’l Bank v. United States, 443 F.2d 116, 119 (5th Cir. 1971) (“The use of Treasury 
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Because the rules regarding charitable split-interest donations were 
significantly revised in 1969,180 the U.S. Supreme Court, not 
surprisingly, has cited Ithaca Trust only once after that date, in 
Commisioner v. Hubert’s Estate.181  In Hubert, the plurality 
opinion182 cited to Ithaca Trust in the context of section 7520183 and 
the use of annuity tables to determine present value.184  The Court has 
not equated the requirement that valuation be made as of the 
decedent’s date of death with a fixed rule that post-death events 
should never be considered to determine the date of death value.185  
 
Department actuarial tables for the purpose of determining the present value of future 
contingent interests in property has been for many years recognized and approved by the 
Supreme Court.”).  In order to provide simplicity and certainty, the actuarial tables 
displace a factual analysis.  Thus, the rule in Ithaca Trust ensures those goals only where 
actuarial tables alone are required to be applied for valuation purposes.  On the other hand, 
where a factual determination must be used to determine value, there is no increased 
certainty or simplicity in valuation when a court ignores relevant post-death events than 
when it wrestles with pre-death and moment-of-death events to calculate date of death 
value. 
180 See supra Part V.A.  However, even before 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court rarely 
cited Ithaca Trust and when cited, it was mostly in connection with a different charitable 
deduction issue: where a withdrawal power in a trust might deplete the CRT, it must be 
subject to a fixed standard in order to be deductible.  See, e.g., Comm’r v. Estate of 
Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187, 199 (1955); Henslee v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 
335 U.S. 595, 598 (1949); Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 256, 259–63 (1943); 
United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272, 281 (1934).  With respect to valuation, 
the Court obliquely referred to Ithaca Trust in Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U.S. 573, 579–80 
(1929), when the Court cited Ithaca Trust as deciding a different issue from the one then 
before the Court.  The Court held that, to determine gain for income tax purposes, unlike 
in Ithaca Trust, the value of taxpayer’s insurance policies was their actual value on 
maturity, a certain value not dependent on estimates forecasting future events.  Id. at 581.  
In Detroit Bank v. United States, the Court cited Ithaca Trust, after stating, “[t]he lien 
attaches at the date of the decedent’s death, since the gross estate is determined as of that 
date and the estate tax itself becomes an obligation of the estate at that time without 
assessment.”  317 U.S. 329, 332 (1943).  The Court was not then concerned with 
valuation, but rather the time at which the estate tax liability attached to the estate.  Id.  In 
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court cited Ithaca Trust to 
underline the uncertainty of all valuation.  338 U.S. 1, 10 (1949). 
181 520 U.S. 93, 102 (1997).  In Hubert, the Court held that the estate did not have to 
reduce the marital or charitable deductions by the amount of administrative expenses that 
were paid with post-death income.  Id. at 99–111; see also I.R.C. § 2056(b)(4) (2006). 
182 Justice Kennedy wrote the plurality opinion in Hubert, and Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined him. 
183 See supra note 176. 
184 See Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. at 101–02. 
185 Neither the concurring opinion nor the dissenting opinion in Hubert considered 
Ithaca Trust helpful in deciding that case.  Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Souter and 
Thomas, wrote the concurring opinion and stated: 
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Indeed, in Hubert, Justice Scalia stated: “The provisions of the estate 
tax clearly reject such a notion of symmetry and do not sharply 
discriminate between date-of-death and postmortem events insofar as 
the allowance of deductions for claims against and obligations of the 
estate are concerned.”186 
Because the confirmation agreement and the sale at a bargain rate 
by the charity to the donors’ children and grandchildren in McCord 
were both expressly anticipated in the donors’ assignment agreement, 
they should be used to determine the date of the gift value of the 
partnership interest the donors transferred,187 and to reconsider the 
value of the donors’ gift to charity.  Like the actual sales proceeds of 
a vehicle defining the value of that charitable donation,188 the value 
of the unmarketable FLP interests that the donors in McCord 
contributed to the two charities should be limited to their sales price 
to the donors’ children.  The donors’ $2.5 million charitable 
 
The plurality nevertheless believes that these regulations bear indirectly on this 
inquiry by implying an underlying estate tax valuation theory that, in the 
plurality’s view, dovetails nicely with our decision in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United 
States.  It is on the basis of this valuation theory that the plurality is able to 
conclude that the Tax Court’s analysis was wrong because that analysis did not, 
consistent with the plurality’s theory, focus solely on anticipated administrative 
expenses and anticipated income.  But, as Justice Scalia points out, the 
plurality’s valuation theory is not universally applicable and, in fact conflicts 
with the Commissioner’s treatment of some other expenses.  Because § 
25.2523(a)-1(e) and its accompanying provisions do no more than suggest an 
estate tax valuation theory that itself has questionable value in this context, these 
provisions do not in my view provide any meaningful guidance in this case. 
Id. at 115–16 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).  The concurring opinion 
agreed with the dissent that Ithaca Trust did not “provide any meaningful guidance in this 
case.  Id. at 116.  Likewise, the dissent stated, “[t]he plurality’s reference to Ithaca Trust 
Co. v. United States is unhelpful.”  Id. at 134 n.2 (citation omitted).  However, the dissent 
stated, “[t]hat case [Ithaca Trust] holds that date-of-death valuation is applicable to 
bequeathed assets, not that it is applicable to claims and obligations that are to be satisfied 
out of those assets.”  Id. at 134 n.2. 
186 Id. at 134 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Although Justice Scalia wrote the dissent in 
Hubert, in which he was joined by Justice Breyer, the issue of whether after death facts 
may be considered to value a claim against the estate under section 2053 was not before 
the Court.  Interestingly, not only was Justice Scalia joined by Justice Breyer in his 
dissent, but Justice O’Connor, who was joined by Justices Souter and Thomas in her 
concurring opinion in Hubert, might have agreed with Justice Scalia on this issue.  Justice 
O’Connor stated, “[b]ut, as Justice Scalia points out, the plurality’s valuation theory is not 
universally applicable and, in fact conflicts with the Commissioner’s treatment of some 
other expenses.”  Id. at 115 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
187 That value may factor in adjustments, if any are necessary, attributable to 
“intervening” events or to the time value of money. 
188 I.R.C. § 170(f)(12) (2006); supra notes 27, 34–39 and accompanying text. 
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deduction should have been restricted to the $479,008 the charities 
actually received.  The donors’ benefits, both in terms of the transfer 
taxes they saved from the undervaluation of their gifts to their family 
and the overvaluation of their charitable contribution, equal the 
government’s losses and they far exceed the relatively minor benefit 
the charities received.  Under a quid pro quo analysis, the donors 
lacked donative intent and received economic benefits far in excess of 
those obtained by the charities. 
VIII 
NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS AND SOME SOLUTIONS 
Very simply, as the charitable deduction is constructed, the 
government should not lose more revenue than a maximum 
percentage (currently somewhere between thirty and forty-five 
percent)189 of the amount that actually benefits a charity.  In most of 
the quid pro quo transactions discussed in this Article, the benefits the 
donor receives either from the charity or from the government are 
larger than the benefit the charity obtains.  When self-interest 
outweighs the benefits to the charity, that quid pro quo contravenes 
the holding of American Bar Association and the rationale for the 
charitable deduction.  Under a broader quid pro quo analysis, those 
donors do not serve the public good and therefore should not be 
entitled to a charitable deduction. 
If the “net benefit” theory consistently applied to conditional gifts 
like nursing home fees or litigation settlements, the taxpayer would be 
denied a charitable deduction since the transfers are more sales-like 
than “donative” and the benefit the donor receives equals his gift to 
charity.  Moreover, donations of in-kind property that present 
valuation difficulties or are illiquid should be deductible only in the 
year, and amount actually received when sold by the charity.190  That 
 
189 The maximum income tax rate is 35% and the maximum transfer tax rate is 45%.  
See I.R.C. §§ 1, 2000 (2006).  Note that the income tax charitable deduction, unlike the 
gift or estate tax charitable deduction, is capped at a deduction in the current year of 50% 
of the donor’s contribution base, with a five-year carryover.  See supra note 4. 
190 An exception to this rule could apply to in-kind property that the charity uses for its 
exempt purpose.  That exception should incorporate some of the language in section 
170(e)(1)(B)(i) for tangible personal property and expand it to real property that is 
unmarketable but actually used by the charity for its exempt purpose. 
 1180 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 1133 
rule would have made the donors’ charitable gift of an FLP interest in 
McCord reflect the actual benefit the two charities received.191 
In addition, the taxpayer’s deduction should parallel the timing of 
the charity’s benefit.  With CLTs, the government’s loss stems from 
the taxpayer’s charitable deduction, which may exceed the amount 
actually given to the charity when there is an income shortfall, and 
from the loss in revenue from the undertaxation of the noncharitable 
gift because the principal’s actual appreciation and income production 
exceed their value calculated by means of the actuarial tables.  
Therefore, this Article recommends reforms for charitable split-
interest gifts that echo those applicable to patent donations: “Rather 
than estimating income and gift/estate tax liabilities at the time of 
transfer to the charitable lead trust, the tax consequences of the 
donations could be determined when they are actually received.”192  
In addition, the transfer tax liability for the noncharitable remainder 
should be determined at the end of the charity’s interest when the 
donor’s gift to third parties becomes possessory.193  Likewise, gifts to 
private foundations where the donor retains control should be 
deductible only when funds are actually distributed from the 
foundation to a charity. 
To insure adequate compliance with all of these new rules, there 
should be additional reporting requirements applicable where 
necessary to both the charities and taxpayers.194 
 
 
191 Insider trading laws should apply to CEOs who donate their company’s stock to a 
charity.  However, to the extent that those laws are not revised as they should be, there 
should be a recapture provision reflecting that kind of abuse. 
192 2008 S. Hearing, supra note 6, at 8.  That reform would resemble the treatment 
accorded patent donations to the extent that with those donations with additional value 
beyond basis is included in years subsequent to the donation to reflect the actual value that 
the charity receives.  See supra Part II, notes 26, 29–33 and accompanying text. 
193 While abandoning the use of the actuarial tables would eliminate the simplicity and 
certainty characteristic of those tables, it would satisfy the American Bar Endowment 
requirements that the charity’s benefit from the taxpayer’s transfer exceed her financial 
gain and that the taxpayer’s transfer reflect donative intent.  That rule should also be 
applied in the context of noncharitable future interests as well in such techniques as a 
grantor retained annuity trust (“GRAT”) or grantor retained unitrust (“GRUT”), but a 
detailed consideration of that issue is not within the scope of this Article. 
194 While admittedly the extra benefit of unrealized gain is not supported by any cogent 
tax policy, the double benefit bestowed on certain appreciated in-kind gifts to charity is 
currently not very expensive in terms of additional revenue loss and may indeed encourage 
larger donations and, therefore, greater benefits to a charity.  Therefore, this article does 
not recommend any changes to the tax law in this respect at this time. 
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CONCLUSION 
In some instances when the taxpayer makes a charitable donation, 
the loss of revenue to the government far exceeds the benefit to the 
charity.  The government’s loss derives from government-sanctioned 
complex transactions like those in McCord and even government-
created devices like the CLT.  The rationale for the charitable 
deduction is that the government is using the tax system to serve the 
public good indirectly through the charity.  Congress should reform 
the provisions so that the donor’s tax benefits correspond to only a 
small portion of the charity’s gains when the deduction primarily 
serves private financial advantage.  To achieve that goal, the 
taxpayer’s deduction should be synchronized with the charity’s 
benefit.  In the case of in-kind property donations presenting 
valuation difficulties, the deduction should be limited to, and timed 
together with, the property’s sale proceeds unless the charity uses the 
contributed property for the charity’s tax-exempt purpose. 
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